In the case of fraud and public corruption

_______________________________________________________________________

WORK NOTES composed after my research and some investigation. Susan’s allegations are taken from the court record.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE FAMILY COURT
) FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL
) CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON ) CASE NO.: 87-DR-10-0294
)
SUSAN RICE COLLETTE ) There is no Susan Rice Collette
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) FINAL ORDER
)
RICHARD STANLEY COLLETTE, )
)
Respondent . )
______________________________)

TRIAL JUDGE: The Honorable B. J. Warshauer
HEARING DATE: SEPTEMBER 10, 1987
PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY: Lon H. Shull, III
RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEY: W. Robert Kinard

No COURT REPORTER

This matter comes before me for final hearing pursuant to a Petition filed by Susan Rice Collette.

Susan Lee Rice is not Susan Rice Collette:
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Dorchester County Probate Judge Shelton Parker aided and abetted Susan Lee Rice in forging the name of Richard Stanley Collette to a marriage license dated April 21, 1984. Susan has consistently alleged herself to have been the wife of Richard based upon her forged marriage license. The forgery is blatant and obvious on its face. Forgery of a marriage license can never morph into a marriage. Susan has never alleged a common law marriage and she is on record stating that, Richard only viewed her as the “maid”—clearly demonstrating Susan knew she did not have a common law marriage with Richard.
Susan’s reliance on someone like Parker in her scheme of fraud speaks to her lack of character and illicit connections.
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Shelton Parker later committed suicide in federal prison on an unrelated fraud conviction after his murder-for-hire scheme was exposed.
Also see, Matter of Parker, 437 SE 2d 37 - SC: Supreme Court 1993 http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10503038827319104253&q=Shelton+J.+Parker&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
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It is obvious on its face that when a case is brought before the wrong court and some action is improperly taken that the issue is to be ‘vacated’ by said court—because—it is null and void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Filing an appeal would be another improper and futile action. Susan had no standing to bring any family court action against Richard.
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t63c003.htm
SECTION 63-3-530. Jurisdiction in domestic matters.
(A) The family court has EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION:
(25) to modify or VACATE any order issued by the court;
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11280692989891791633&q=428+SE2d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002
Hallums v. Bowens, 428 SE 2d 894 – SC: Court of Appeals 1993
It patently appears that the family court did not have jurisdiction to allocate properties of this unmarried couple. When it became apparent that no marriage was involved, there could be no marital property as contemplated by our law. Accordingly, the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter.
It is with some reluctance that we raise the issue ex mero motu, but it is inescapable that the issues should have been submitted to a court of common pleas. A court, lacking subject matter jurisdiction, cannot enforce its own decrees. It would serve no useful purposes to determine issues submitted to the court since the jurisdiction as to subject matter can be raised at any time, and if the case were remanded to the family court, it would have no authority to carry out its previously ordered mandate.
The family courts of this state have jurisdiction to deal with family problems. It has no jurisdiction to settle property disputes between unmarried people.
DISMISSED.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=56300426960017172&q=428+SE2d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002
Simmons v. Simmons, 634 SE 2d 1 – SC: Court of Appeals 2006
It is axiomatic that an order entered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is utterly void. Coon v. Coon, 356 S.C. 342, 347, 588 S.E.2d 624, 627 (Ct.App.2003), aff'd as modified, 364 S.C. 563, 614 S.E.2d 616 (2005). Moreover, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Hallums v. Bowens, 318 S.C. 1, 3, 428 S.E.2d 894, 895 (Ct.App.1993). […]
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15624257523578678835&q=Bateman+v.+Rouse&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Bateman v. Rouse, App. Ct. (2004) Op. No. 3792
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There was fourteen (14) years between the alleged 1983 divorce in the Bateman case and the filing of a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate that order based on fraud upon the court which the Charleston County family court granted in 1997.
This alleged 1987 divorce of Susan’s is clearly defective on its face and a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate was filed December 27, 2000 which the Charleston County family court dismissed in 2001.

Present at the hearing is the Petitioner and her attorney, Lon H. Shull, III. Also present at the hearing is the Respondent and his attorney, W. Robert Kinard.

Lon Shull was newly employed in the Rosen, Rosen and Hagood law firm when he first started representing Susan (1984-85).
See, In the Matter of Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25346
(Shull later moved into a partnership with fellow Rosen employee Mark Andrews, the husband of Francis P. Segars-Andrews.)
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David Crawford was the attorney of record for Richard and inexplicably—appeared—to have abandoned the case—even though Shull’s billing hours showed an on going contact with Crawford.
Kinard only filed a Special Appearance in this case challenging the jurisdiction of the Charleston County family court because Richard had become a resident of Berkeley County—with both counties being in the ninth judicial circuit.
Special appearance:
The representation by an attorney of a person in court for only that particular session of court on behalf of the client’s regular attorney of record and only on the grounds set out in the appearance.
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Richard was not represented at this ‘Final Hearing’—which from the record appears to have been the ‘only hearing’. Neither Crawford nor Kinard provided Richard any representation and failed to file any responses to Susan’s allegations.

Prior the hearing the attorneys advised the Court that an Agreement had been reached between the parties settling all issues except that of the divorce.

The pre-trial Brief flied by Shull plainly states that no agreement had been reached. Shull verbally alleges (‘advised’) an agreement here—prior to the hearing. Attorneys and judges know that agreements have to be in writing, fully detailed and signed by the parties.
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t63c017.htm
SECTION 63-17-40. Settlement and voluntary agreements.
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t20c005.htm
SECTION 20-5-50. Requisites of marriage contracts, deeds and settlements.

The Court examined both of the parties and finds that there is no possibility of reconciliation between the parties.

Subsequent to the presentation of the Agreement the Petitioner moved to amend her Petition to request a divorce on the statutory grounds of one year’s separation, a vinculo matrimonii. This Motion was joined in by the Respondent and the Court allowed the amendment of the Petition.

No court reporter was present to enter this alleged agreement on the record. Susan was improperly allowed to amend her Petition at this juncture and her fraud was allowed to proceed on nothing more than the alleged and undocumented agreement. Susan’s grounds were changed in furtherance of the scheme to defraud Richard out of a hearing on the merits as evidenced in this document. No written agreement has ever been presented.

Based upon the representations of counsel, the testimony presented in Court and the entire case record of this matter I make the following findings of fact.

Warshauer herein confessed that he relied on the ‘representations of counsel’. Warshauer had a duty to know and therefore did know that counsel could not testify.
Warshauer’s allegations of ‘testimony presented’ are irrelevant under the circumstances showing on the face of this document.
Warshauer knew that Susan’s pleadings in the case record were inadmissible and that she would have to lay a foundation for her allegations and testify on the record. Warshauer failed to have a court reporter present in this court of record.
Warshauer confessed his reliance on ‘the entire case record’ in forming his Findings of Fact. No answers were filed to any of Susan’s allegations on Richard’s behalf.
It is obvious on the face of this document that Richard was defrauded out of a hearing on the merits by officers of the court.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14787150736663584803&q=Bradley+v.+Fisher&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 US 335 - Supreme Court 1872, Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. That the parties last lived together as husband and wife in the County of Charleston, State of South Carolina in March of 1986 and that this Court has jurisdiction over all these matters.

While a date of marriage is important in all cases of divorce—none is given here for Susan. Susan’s marriage license forgery was on April 21, 1984. It is established law that one must be married before the family court can acquire jurisdiction in a divorce action. It is established law that forgery of a marriage license can never morph into a marriage.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/sclr58&div=26&id=&page=
A court cannot address an alleged spouse’s claim for property distribution in divorce or probate proceedings without first determining whether a marriage exists.
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t20c003.htm
SECTION 20-3-40. Married person deemed of age.
Any MARRIED person shall, for the purpose of maintaining or defending an action for DIVORCE and the settlement of PROPERTY RIGHTS ARISING THEREUNDER, […]
SECTION 20-3-50. Jurisdiction of actions for divorce.
Actions for DIVORCE FROM THE BONDS OF MATRIMONY […]
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17567965441943681507&q=forgery+of+marriage+license&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
State v. Lee-Grigg, 649 SE 2d 41 - SC: Court of Appeals 2007
It is no defense to the charge of forgery that the defendant considered herself justly entitled to what she would obtain by means of forgery. State v. Webster, 88 S.C. 56, 58, 70 S.E. 422, 423 (1911). […] Furthermore, it is no defense if it was done in partnership or cooperation with another person. Brown v. Bailey, 215 S.C. 175, 54 S.E.2d 769 (1949) (stating that, both under the forgery statute and the common law, a person may commit forgery by being present and knowingly aiding and abetting another in the perpetration of the crime).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2594506616534495840&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004&kqfp=3098509409481193779&kql=202&kqpfp=1645538439690006202#kq
State v. LEE-GRIGG, SC: Supreme Court 2010
[3] Relying upon this Court's opinion in Brown v. Bailey, 215 S.C. 175, 54 S.E.2d 769 (1949), the majority concludes that "good-faith" is a defense to forgery in South Carolina. However, Brown does not recognize a good-faith defense to forgery, merely referencing the concept hypothetically in dicta. 215 S.C. at 191, 54 S.E.2d at 776.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3905142580633783136&q=annulment&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004&as_ylo=2000
Prevatte v. Prevatte, 377 SE 2d 114 - SC: Court of Appeals 1989
"A judgment may be collaterally attacked if the court lacked jurisdiction and the lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record." Yarbrough v. Collins, 293 S.C. 290, 292, 360 S.E. (2d) 300, 301 (1987). […] "[a] relationship illicit at its inception does not ripen into a common law marriage once the impediment to marriage is removed. Instead, the law [in this State] presumes that the relationship retains its illicit character after removal of the impediment.
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III. "The proceedings of a Court of limited jurisdiction, in a case clearly without its jurisdiction, are absolutely void, and may be so declared, whenever the question is presented, whether directly or collaterally."—
- in Reports of cases heard and determined by the Supreme Court of South Carolina and 3 similar citations

"A judgment pronounced by a tribunal having no authority to determine the matter in issue, is necessarily and incurably void, and may be shown to be so in any collateral or other proceeding in which it is drawn in question." Freem. on Judg., § 120; Hillv.
- in Reports of cases heard and determined by the Supreme Court of South Carolina

This fact may appear in any proceeding, direct or collateral, for what is absolutely void may be disregarded as nullity whenever and wherever it is encountered.
- in Reports of cases heard and determined by the Supreme Court of South Carolina

This principle does not intend to exclude any inquiry relative to the jurisdiction of the court, since a judgment rendered by a court which has not jurisdiction, is entirely void.
- in Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of Judicature ...
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MATTER OF MOZINGO, 497 SE 2d 729 - SC: Supreme Court 1998
After the forgery was discovered, respondent stated that Stavely prepared the order and that she traced Justice Toal's signature […] Rule 407, SCACR. Respondent assisted a client in conduct that he knew was criminal and fraudulent. Rule 1.2(d). […]

2. That the parties have reached an Agreement the substance of which is as follows:

“Agreement the substance of which is as follows”:
This is the only written rendition of what is purported to be THE AGREEMENT.
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Anderson v. Bowers, 117 F. Supp. 884 - Dist. Court, WD South Carolina, Spartanburg Div. 1954
It is well-settled in South Carolina that a judgment may be disregarded as a nullity wherever encountered in any proceeding whether direct or collateral where jurisdictional defects appear on the record. […] the court, with reference to collateral attacks on judgments, quotes with approbation from the case of Turner v. Malone, 24 S. C. 398, 401, (1886) […]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8951510906214002820&q=no+contract&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Stanley Smith & sons v. Limestone College, 322 SE 2d 474 – SC: Court of Appeals 1984 (Without the actual agreement of the parties, there is no contract. Edens v. Laurel Hills, Inc., 271 S.C. 360, 247 S.E. (2d) 434 (1978).)

a. That the Respondent will transfer all his interest and ownership in the marital home to the Petitioner as of the date of this Order. The September mortgage payment shall be pro-rated between the parties. As the date of the hearing was the 10th of September, the Petitioner shall be responsible for two-thirds (2/3) of the mortgage payment and the Respondent shall be responsible for one-third (1/3) of the mortgage payment of September. That the Petitioner shall assume all responsibility for the Veteran’s Administration mortgage loan and that the Respondent does hereby warrant to the Court and to the Petitioner that there are no other encumbrances on the marital home.

Susan had alleged that she and Richard acquired property during their marriage and her name was on the title, therein alleging she already held a one half (½) interest in said property.
No address or identification of alleged marital property is mentioned here. However, the above mentioned Veteran’s Administration mortgage loan (and a property title) proves that Richard was the sole title holder on property that was acquired (1979) - Five (5) years before Susan’s April 21, 1984 marriage license forgery. There is no marriage and no marital property.
Shull had a duty to know and therefore did know and is correctly presumed to have actually known these facts at this juncture through mentioning the VA mortgage.
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On November 6, 1989 Richard was illegally coerced by officers of this court into signing entire interest in his property to Susan under duress of indefinite jailing on contempt until he did sign. David Crawford re-enters representation of Richard at this juncture and is shown to have assisted in the fraudulent taking of Richard’s property and failing to provide him any representation.

b. That the Respondent shall pay unto the Petitioner Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars per month as child support. Said amount to be paid directly to the Petitioner.

Susan had alleged that she produced a child to her marriage to Richard and that he was the natural (biological) father of that child. All that is mentioned here is Susan is to receive $200.00 dollars per month “as” child support without declaring the name, age or gender of any child or that any child was born to this fictitious marriage.
Susan was Three (3) months pregnant by an unknown man when she forged Richard’s signature to her bogus marriage license. Susan is self-declared and known to be White. Richard is White. The full term child born to Susan on October 25, 1984 is fully Asian featured and therefore a physical impossibility for Richard to have sired. Paternity and custody of this child is not determined or even mentioned on this document.
Richard’s only possible relationship / association with the child of Susan may have been one of in loco parentis strictly by virtue of the child’s presence in Richard’s home. That contact ended when Susan had Richard illegally removed from his home in March 1986
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t63c017.htm
SECTION 63-17-20. Jurisdiction. (A) Any person who has sexual intercourse in this State thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to an action brought under this article with respect to a child who MAY have been conceived by that act of intercourse.
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(Does anyone reading this material believe that two White people can produce a fully Asian featured child? If you do, produce documented evidence to support your belief.)
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SECTION 63-17-340. Persons who may petition for support.
Any interested persons may file a petition to the court requesting the court to order persons LEGALLY CHARGEABLE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT as required by law.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10868979783950578390&q=In+loco+parentis&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Chestnut v. Chestnut, 147 SE 2d 269 - SC: Supreme Court 1966
"One important qualification is that one merely standing in the place of a parent may abandon the burdens attendant upon such status at any time. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 80, pages 808, 809; Menefee v. Chesley, 98 Iowa 55, 59, 66 N.W. 1038, 1040. In McDonald v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, Tex. Civ. App., 267 S.W. 1074, 1076, it is said: `* * * the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child.' To the same effect is this language from In re McCardle's Estate, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P. (2d) 850, 851: `It (loco parentis) is not, as argued, to be likened to that of adoption. The one temporary in character, the other permanent and abiding.' See also Schneider v. Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A. (2d) 564, 566."

c. That the Respondent shall continue to carry health and major medical insurance on the minor child and that the parties shall divide equally all medical expenses not covered by insurance.

No proof of any medical insurance or identification of any alleged minor child is given.
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t63c017.htm
SECTION 63-17-2110. Contents of order.
To be enforced pursuant to this article, a court order which requires a parent to provide health coverage for a child must: (1) clearly specify: (a) the name, social security number, and last known mailing address, if any, of the parent and the NAME, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DATE OF BIRTH, and MAILING ADDRESS of each CHILD covered by the order;

d. Both parties waive any type of alimony now and forever.

e. Both parties waive any claim for attorneys fees against the other.

f. With regard to personal property the parties are satisfied with the division of the personal property with the exception of the Respondent’s bicycle, tools, a set of china and a bedroom suit. The Petitioner hereby agrees that the Respondent shall have ownership of those items of property in addition to any items of property he had prior to this hearing removed from the home.

g. The Petitioner expressly warrants to the Court that she has no objection to the minor child’s christening in the Catholic church.

No identification of the mystery minor child.

h. That the Respondent shall have reasonable and liberal visitation including every other weekend from 6:00 PM on Friday to 6:00 PM on Sunday; alternating the major holidays of Christmas, New Years, Easter, July 4th and Thanksgiving; allowing the Respondent extended visitation in the summer as arranged by the parties and for such other times as the parties may mutually agree.

No identification of whom or what this “visitation” is to be with.
This visitation could not rationally be with the ‘child of Susan’. Susan’s alleged grounds for divorce were unsupported allegations of alcohol and drug abuse by Richard which Susan portrayed as endangering the life and welfare of her child. Any occasion in which Susan left her child with Richard after this point in time would be attributed to Susan’s reckless endangerment of her child -- based on her allegations against Richard.
The record shows that Richard did not pursue visitation with the child of Susan— in loco parentis ended.

3. That at the time of this hearing, the Petitioner’s net monthly income was Two Hundred Eighty ($280.00) Dollars per month and her expenses as listed on her Financial Declaration were One Thousand One Hundred Ten ($1,110.00) Dollars.

4. That at the time of this hearing the Respondent’s net income was zero (0) and his expenses were One Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Seven ($1,197.00) Dollars per month.

Zero income = zero funds for insurance premiums.
The one and only legal citation offered in Shull’s pre-trial brief was to a case which addressed ‘imputing income’ to one who was underemployed or unemployed. Shull improperly cited by using only the name of one of the litigants and neglecting where the case could be located.
There are no legal citations by Shull or Warshauer on this document.

5. That the Court examined both of the parties with regard to the fairness and equity of the Agreement and found that both parties agreed with the provisions of the Agreement and understood them fully and desired that the Court incorporate this Agreement into its Order.

6. That based upon the representations of the parties and the Financial Declarations filed by both parties the Court finds the Agreement is fair and equitable under the circumstances then and there prevailing at the time of the hearing.

7. That the parties have been living separate and apart on a continuous basis in excess of one year.

8. That the Petitioner presented the corroborating testimony of Ms. Flynn, the Petitioner’s sister, and that the Court finds that no collusion was entered into by the parties and that the parties have indeed been living separate and apart on a continuous basis in excess of one year.

This is the only mention of any testimony. There is a clear and compelling indication of collusion and conspiracy between Susan and officers of the court in assisting her in her sham divorce under color of law.
The only “separation” in this case is where Richard was illegally ousted from ‘his property’ in March 1986 by one purported to be a Charleston County Sheriff’s deputy on Susan’s unsupported allegation that she “found drugs in his closets”. And any possible in loco parentis relationship between Richard and the ‘child of Susan’ ended in March 1986.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. That the Agreement is fair and equitable and should be incorporated into this Court’s Order and Decree and be fully enforceable as such.

2. That the Petitioner is entitled to a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the statutory grounds of one year’s separation. It is therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that the Petitioner is granted a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the statutory grounds of one year’s separation and that the Agreement, as set out above, is hereby fully incorporated into the Order of this Court and enforceable as same.

Shull / Warshauer plainly did not cite to any laws. Unmarried persons cannot be grated a divorce. There is no agreement on this document or in the record of this case.
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t63c017.htm
SECTION 63-17-40. Settlement and voluntary agreements.
(A) […] Upon a finding of fairness the court shall approve, without a hearing, SETTLEMENTS AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS which are REDUCED TO WRITING, SIGNED by the parties, and PROPERLY VERIFIED. The agreement must be accompanied by financial declarations and AFFIDAVITS from the custodial and noncustodial PARENTS stating that they have read, or have had read to them, and understand the agreement and that they have voluntarily executed the agreement or consent order. The parties may submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by a SETTLEMENT or voluntary AGREEMENT which MUST BE FILED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT. A defendant's affidavit must state that the defendant is capable of fulfilling any financial requirements of the agreement or consent order applicable to the defendant. Upon the court's approval, the settlement or voluntary agreement becomes an order of the court.
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t20c005.htm
SECTION 20-5-50. Requisites of marriage contracts, deeds and settlements.
ALL MARRIAGE contracts, deeds and SETTLEMENTS shall therein describe, specify and particularize the real and personal estate thereby intended to be included, comprehended, conveyed and passed or shall have a schedule thereto annexed containing a description and the particulars and articles of the real and personal estate intended to be conveyed and passed by such marriage contracts, deeds and SETTLEMENTS. Any such schedule shall be annexed to the contract, deed or other SETTLEMENT paper, signed, executed and delivered by the parties therein interested at the time of the signing, executing and delivering the marriage contract, deed or SETTLEMENT, be subscribed by the same witness who subscribed the marriage contract, deed or SETTLEMENT and be recorded therewith; otherwise, and in default of such schedule and recording thereof as aforesaid, the marriage contract, deed or SETTLEMENT shall be deemed and declared to be FRAUDULENT, NULL AND VOID with respect to and against creditors and bona fide purchasers or mortgagees.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

I hereby certify that I verily believe this Order to be in compliance with Rule 27(c) of the Family Court Rules.

Warshauer was overturned for violation of Rule 27(c) in the 1984 case of Condon v. Condon.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5020979350583257345&q=Condon+v.+Condon&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Condon v. Condon, 312 SE 2d 588 - SC: Court of Appeals 1984
On remand the Family Court should make specific findings of fact on the factors we outlined in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 309 S.E. (2d) 14 (S.C. App. 1983).
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12534393329849798335&q=what+is+a+court+order&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 309 SE 2d 14 - SC: Court of Appeals 1983
Proper appellate review is extremely difficult, if not impossible, where a lower court order omits specific findings of fact to support its legal conclusions. […] we believe that strict compliance with the rule promotes the administration of justice at every judicial level.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6957058000541232253&q=Carter+v.+Carter&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Carter v. Carter, 286 SE 2d 139 - SC: Supreme Court 1982
Initially, we recognize that the divorce decree fails to set forth the salient facts upon which the lower court […] Because the order does not comply with the requirements of Family Court Rule 27(3), the record is insufficient to permit review by this Court. Stahl v. Stahl, S.C. 278 S.E. (2d) 782, 1981; Garvin v. Garvin, 275 S.C. 379, 271 S.E. (2d) 413 (1980). Also, the judgment was entered in contravention of Family Court Rule 16. […] We believe that appellant was similarly denied the right to a hearing as contemplated by Family Court Rule 16.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7466730811218343975&q=Micheau+v.+Micheau&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Micheau v. Micheau, 331 SE 2d 348 - SC: Supreme Court 1985
We urge judges and attorneys who prepare orders to pay careful attention to their work product in order to afford this Court a sufficient basis upon which to review the lower court's conclusions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Moseley v. Mosier, 306 SE 2d 624 - SC: Supreme Court 1983 (Jan L. Warner and C. Dixon Lee, III, Sumter, for appellant.) Furthermore, the second element of contempt, a court order, is absent in this case. Respondent's child support obligation arises out of a separation agreement not a court order.

__________________________________
THE HONORABLE B. J. WARSHAUER
JUDGE OF THE FAMILY COURT FOR
THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
This 22 day of September, 1987.
Charleston, South Carolina

Warshauer failed to exercise any judicial discretion and improperly imposed an alleged agreement upon Richard in direct contravention of all established law.
Warshauer did knowingly in willful wanton violation of all established law illegally issue a sham order under color of law to fraudulently coerce Richard into compliance with an alleged agreement which did not exist in law or in fact. This sham decree of divorce, purported to be the agreement, on its face is a clear and blatant violation of the 14th Amendment: “…nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”.
Warshauer’s certification of compliance with Rule 27, SCRFC cannot convert these frauds into a lawful court order it only certifies the lack of credibility and integrity of the defendants in this action. Warshauer’s order was VOID AB INITIO.
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Susan filed no motions with the court to have her allegations heard and ruled on.
Susan’s case throughout its entire history has rested exclusively on a nonexistent agreement, false allegations and conclusory arguments without ever presenting any evidence, corroborating testimony or citations of supporting law.
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Richard was never served with a copy of this sham decree. It was finally mailed to him April 7, 2000 -- thirteen (13) years after the alleged divorce. It was immediately obvious on its face to be critically defective and representative of a fraud upon the court aided and abetted by officers of the court.

Susan admitted on the record that she had no personal knowledge concerning Richard (since the separation of 1986) -- it was all “hearsay” (June 13, 2001 transcript page 23, lines 17-20).

===============================================================

I (Lilly) was forced to pursue this matter Pro se as no licensed attorney would accept the case. December 27, 2000 I filed a SCRCP. RULE 60(b)(4)(5) motion for Relief From Judgment based upon extrinsic fraud upon the court to get this bogus order Vacated.
Richard was having health problems again and was once again facing one of Susan’s many fraudulent Rule To Show Cause (RTSC) hearings in this court for failure to provide child support—which had never been ordered.
December 29, 2000 Richard applied by telephone for Social Security Disability income (SSDI). When the SSA intake worker asked him about prior marriages / children Richard informed the intake person about Susan’s fraud and denied being the father of Susan’s child. The intake worker was informed by Richard and me that we were going back to family court to get this mess vacated.

===============================================================

This is the ORDER TO DISMISS our Rule 60(b) motion issued by Jack A. Landis on May 11, 2001 followed by my work notes and my citations of law.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE FAMILY COURT
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON ) NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
) No.: 01-DR-10-0721
RICHARD S. COLLETTE, )
PETITIONER )
vs. )
) ORDER TO DISMISS
SUSAN R. COLLETTE )
RESPONDENT )
____________________________)
This matter was heard on April 25, 2001 upon a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed on behalf of the Respondent, Susan R. Collette by her attorney, John Sinclaire, III.
Present at the hearing were the Petitioner, Richard S. Collette, his Paralegal, Lilly Smith and the Attorney for the Respondent, John Sinclaire, III. The Respondent, Susan R. Collette was not present.
After a review of all the pleadings and a brief submitted on behalf of the Petitioner ans after consideration of the arguments made at the hearing, I find that the crux of the allegations raised in the Complaint as follows:

1. A lack of jurisdiction of this court over the person of Mr. Collette,

2. An allegation of fraud supposedly perpetrated on the Petitioner and the Family Court in 1987,

3. The propriety of the execution of the settlement that was included in the original Order of Divorce, including the equitable division of property and child support, and

4. The possibility that the child for whom the support was paid is not the child of the Petitioner.

I further find that all of the issues raised are issues that could have been and should have been determined at the time of the final divorce hearing in 1987. From the Final Order of Divorce, issued by the Honorable B. J. Warshauer Case No. 87-DR-10-0294, Mr. Collette had the opportunity to appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court. He also had the right to file motions under Rules 59 and 60 of the South Carolina Rules of Practice. The time for appeal and the time for making those motions under the Rules have passed.
The Complaint is in essence asking this Court for a readjudication of those issues; in effect, asking this Court to act as an appellate court and go behind Judge Warshauer’s final order issued in 1987. I cannot act in that capacity.
This Court does have the capacity to review previous Orders pertaining to issues of custody, child support, visitation, and other issues relating to the welfare of the child, or alimony or spousal support, had it been ordered. In those cases, the Court’s right of review is limited to situations involving allegations of substantially changed circumstances.
I find that the Complaint in this case does not raise any allegations of substantially changed circumstances. The circumstances that have been alleged are circumstances that existed at the time this matter was decided in 1987. Accordingly, the allegations in the Complaint are not properly before me. There is no cause of action stated or predicated on any substantially changed circumstances.
THEREFORE for the reasons hereinabove stated, for the fact that the issues raised in the Complaint are res judicata and for the fact that there has been no cause of action stated regarding substantially changed circumstances upon which this Court could review and modify the Order of Judge Warshauer,
IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed on behalf of the Respondent is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition may not raise the allegations contained in his Complaint in the hearing of Respondent’s Rule To Show Cause motion scheduled to be heard on May 16, 2001.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of May, 2001.
_________________________________
THE HONORABLE JACK A. LANDIS
Judge of the Family Court
Ninth Judicial Circuit
Charleston, South Carolina.

ATTEST: A TRUE COPY
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG (SEAL)
CLERK, FAMILY COURT
By Hazel S. Smalls
DEPUTY CLERK

________________________________________________________________________

WORK NOTES:

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE FAMILY COURT
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON ) NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
) No.: 01-DR-10-0721
RICHARD S. COLLETTE, )
PETITIONER )
vs. )
) ORDER TO DISMISS
SUSAN R. COLLETTE )
RESPONDENT )
____________________________)
This matter was heard on April 25, 2001 upon a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed on behalf of the Respondent, Susan R. Collette by her attorney, John Sinclaire, III.
The Complaint of Richard Collette was a Rule 60(b) (4); (5) motion for Relief From Judgment based upon extrinsic fraud upon the court and it was filed on December 27, 2000.
Present at the hearing were the Petitioner, Richard S. Collette, his Paralegal, Lilly Smith and the Attorney for the Respondent, John Sinclaire, III. The Respondent, Susan R. Collette was not present.
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4937060075303572109&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004&kqfp=6654171367253038649&kql=143&kqpfp=16682082715666451242#kq
Brewington v. Brewington, 313 SE 2d 53 - SC: Court of Appeals 1984
[W]e hold that an agent possessed of a valid and durable power of attorney may institute in the name of a principal an action for […] equitable relief. See Kaplan v. Kaplan, 256 N.Y. 366, 176 N.E. 426 (1931); Moore v. Moore, 205 Ga. 355, 53 S.E. (2d) 343 (1949).
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Richard had granted me power of attorney. The court agreed to my representing Richard under the authority at S.C. Code SECTION 40-5-80.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is alleged and believed that sometime in 2001-2002 someone from the Charleston County family court did contact a member of the S.C. Legislature possibly Chip Campsen to push for a change in S.C. Code § 40-5-80 deleting the portion of that code under which I proceeded with Richard’s motion to “Vacate” all orders procured through fraud. (S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-80 (1986): any individual may represent another individual before any tribunal, if (1) the tribunal approves of the representation and (2) the representative is not compensated for his services.)

The removal of that section was signed into law June 5, 2002. I was promptly removed from the case without a hearing on allegations that my continued representation would become the (Ex Post Facto) Unauthorized Practice Of Law. I was locked out of the court room of Francis P. Segars-Andrews during a fraudulent RTSC in which Richard was denied representation and witnesses. Segars-Andrews unlawfully increased her previous illegal order of garnishment of Fifty (50 %) of Richard’s SSDI to Sixty five (65 %) on allegations of failure to provide child support—which had never and could never be lawfully ordered.

This was an obviously unlawful move by the legislature in violation of the Separation of Powers, as the Supreme Court had already ruled on this matter in 1992 bringing it under the court’s jurisdiction. See, In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 SE 2d 123 - SC: Supreme Court 1992
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14955031684952914278&q=unauthorized+practice+of+law&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002
In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 SE 2d 123 - SC: Supreme Court 1992
The Constitution commits to this Court the duty to regulate the practice of law in South Carolina. S.C. Const. art. V, § 4; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-10- (1986). We take this opportunity to clarify certain practices which we hold do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
First, we recognize the validity of the principle found in S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-80 (1986): any individual may represent another individual before any tribunal, if (1) the tribunal approves of the representation and (2) the representative is not compensated for his services.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13755310345668865705&q=Francis+P.+Segars-Andrews&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002
SEGARS-ANDREWS v. JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION COMMISSION, SC: Supreme Court 2010
Petitioner raises several constitutional challenges, including ‘separation of powers’ […]

After a review of all the pleadings and a brief submitted on behalf of the Petitioner ans after consideration of the arguments made at the hearing, I find that the crux of the allegations raised in the Complaint as follows:

1. A lack of jurisdiction of this court over the person of Mr. Collette,

Landis herein clearly documents his awareness that Richard’s complaint was based on a Rule 60(b) motion for Relief From Judgment based on extrinsic fraud upon the court. Landis had a duty to know and therefore did know that the court had the authority and duty to Vacate all actions of fraud.
(Susan was believed and alleged to have been the undivorced common law wife of another. Susan forged Richard’s signature to her bogus marriage license. Richard was not married to Susan. There was a total absence of any / all jurisdiction in this case.)
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t14c001.htm
SECTION 14-1-50. Common law of England shall continue in effect.
All, and every part, of the common law of England, where it is not altered by the Code or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of this State, is hereby continued in full force and effect in the same manner as before the adoption of this section.
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t16c013.htm
SECTION 16-13-10. Forgery.
[…] (B) A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a: (1) felony […]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16421482364225046913&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004&as_ylo=2000&kqfp=5762902969109180830&kql=210&kqpfp=15344178661000196736#kq
Lukich v. Lukich, 627 SE 2d 754 - SC: Court of Appeals 2006,
[…] Day v. Day, 216 S.C. 334, 338, 58 S.E.2d 83, 85 (1950) ("A mere marriage ceremony between a man and a woman, where one of them has a living wife or husband, is not a marriage at all. Such a marriage is absolutely void, and not merely voidable."). […] Additionally, Wife's argument that she had a good-faith belief she was not married to Havron does not change the rule that the bigamous marriage was void. Even if Wife was acting under a good-faith belief, South Carolina will not recognize her bigamous second marriage because to do so would violate public policy.

Lukich v. Lukich, SC: Supreme Court 2008 The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. TOAL, C.J., MOORE, BEATTY, JJ., and Acting Justice Georgia V. Anderson, concur.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17567965441943681507&q=forgery+of+marriage+license&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
State v. Lee-Grigg, 649 SE 2d 41 - SC: Court of Appeals 2007
It is no defense to the charge of forgery that the defendant considered herself justly entitled to what she would obtain by means of forgery. State v. Webster, 88 S.C. 56, 58, 70 S.E. 422, 423 (1911). […] Furthermore, it is no defense if it was done in partnership or cooperation with another person. Brown v. Bailey, 215 S.C. 175, 54 S.E.2d 769 (1949) (stating that, both under the forgery statute and the common law, a person may commit forgery by being present and knowingly aiding and abetting another in the perpetration of the crime).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2594506616534495840&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004&kqfp=3098509409481193779&kql=202&kqpfp=1645538439690006202#kq
State v. LEE-GRIGG, SC: Supreme Court 2010,
CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: In my view, there is no "good-faith" defense to forgery in South Carolina[3] […] In my view, the evidence presented at trial conclusively proved that Lee-Grigg was guilty of the crime of forgery. Forgery involves the false making or material alteration, with the intent to defraud, prejudice, or damage another, of an instrument which serves as the foundation for legal liability. State v. Walton, 107 S.C. 353, 356, 93 S.E. 5, 6 (1917).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11703809271659451518&q=forgery&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
State v. Orr, 82 SE 2d 523 - SC: Supreme Court 1954,
[O]ne found in the possession of a forged instrument of which he purports to be the beneficiary, and applying it to his own use, must, in the absence of explanation satisfactory to the jury, be presumed to have forged it or to have been privy to its forgery." This rule is sustained by the overwhelming weight of authority.
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Anderson v. Anderson, 382 SE 2d 897 - SC: Supreme Court 1989 The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a proceeding is determined by the Constitution, the laws of the state, and is fundamental. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, even by consent of the parties, and should be taken notice of by this Court. Fielden v. Fielden, 274 S.C. 219, 262 S.E. (2d) 43 (1980); Harden v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 266 S.C. 119, 221 S.E. (2d) 851 (1976); State v. Gorie, 256 S.C. 539, 183 S.E. (2d) 334 (1971).

2. An allegation of fraud supposedly perpetrated on the Petitioner and the Family Court in 1987,

The 1987 decree of divorce stands on its own as evidence of the extrinsic fraud as charged and that evidence is supported in the public records of Charleston County.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9640976524557144959&q=fraud+upon+the+court&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004&as_ylo=2000
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 US 61 - Supreme Court 1878
But there is an admitted exception to this general rule in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, […] or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side, — these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and a fair hearing. […]
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15748467093207005474&q=fraud+upon+the+court&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004&as_ylo=2000
Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 550 SE 2d 584 - SC: Court of Appeals 2001
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14514486506109333485&q=fraud+upon+the+court&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004&as_ylo=2000
Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 579 SE 2d 605 - SC: Supreme Court 2003

3. The propriety of the execution of the settlement that was included in the original Order of Divorce, including the equitable division of property and child support, and

There was no marriage and no marital property. There was no adjudication of paternity and no order for the support of any child. There was no settlement and no legal grounds for any settlement. There was only an alleged agreement which could never exist under the facts and law pertinent to this case and has never been produced.

4. The possibility that the child for whom the support was paid is not the child of the Petitioner.

It is utterly preposterous to even think let alone suggest that any White man could have sired a fully Asian featured child by a White woman. No child is identified by name, age or gender as the child of any alleged marriage to Richard and to whom Richard owed any duty of support. There is no adjudication of paternity or even a mention of the custody of this unidentified child.
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=53256572410627025&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004&kqfp=8211344878053039848&kql=126&kqpfp=2804632542438364151#kq
Duckett v. Goforth, SC: Court of Appeals 2007
Res judicata precludes parties from subsequently relitigating issues actually litigated and those that might have been litigated in a prior action. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Basnight, 346 S.C. 241, 249, 551 S.E.2d 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted). […] In South Carolina, a paternity determination for the purposes of child support relates to the natural or biological relationship between father and child. See S.C. Code Ann §§ 20-7-952 through 958 (Supp. 2006). While a child born during a marriage is the presumed legitimate child of the husband, that presumption may be rebutted by a paternity determination. Douglass ex rel. Louthian v. Boyce, 344 S.C. 5, 8, 542 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (2001) (interpreting S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-952 (E) (1985)). Treating a child as a child of the family during the marriage does not rise to the level of a paternity determination in South Carolina. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the family court to address the question of Goforth’s paternity in order to assure H.J. is supported in a manner consistent with South Carolina’s legislative mandate.
I further find that all of the issues raised are issues that could have been and should have been determined at the time of the final divorce hearing in 1987.
Landis makes this outrageous statement in open defiance of the law and evidence of this case. Richard was plainly defrauded out of a hearing in every instance—including this one.
From the Final Order of Divorce, issued by the Honorable B. J. Warshauer Case No. 87-DR-10-0294, Mr. Collette had the opportunity to appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court. He also had the right to file motions under Rules 59 and 60 of the South Carolina Rules of Practice. The time for appeal and the time for making those motions under the Rules have passed.
This court had no jurisdiction in this case and therefore there would be no grounds for an appeal. And even if Landis failed to comprehend that much it was plain on the face of Richard’s Complaint that Landis had a Rule 60 (b)(4)&(5) motion in his hand—which is not barred by time. It is plain on the face of the 1987 decree that it was not in fact a ‘Final Order’ upon which an appeal could be filed—it was only an alleged agreement fraudulently imposed upon Richard under color of law. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11280692989891791633&q=428+SE2d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002 Hallums v. Bowens, 428 SE 2d 894 - SC: Court of Appeals 1993 [T]he Plaintiff had the court issue a Rule to Show Cause why the Defendant should not be held in contempt of court for failure to distribute properties in keeping with the family court judge's Order. […] We dismiss the appeal. It is with some reluctance that we raise the issue ex mero motu, but it is inescapable that the issues should have been submitted to a court of common pleas. A court, lacking subject matter jurisdiction, cannot enforce its own decrees. It would serve no useful purposes to determine issues submitted to the court since the jurisdiction as to subject matter can be raised at any time, and if the case were remanded to the family court, it would have no authority to carry out its previously ordered mandate. The family courts of this state have jurisdiction to deal with family problems. It has no jurisdiction to settle property disputes between unmarried people. DISMISSED.
The Complaint is in essence asking this Court for a readjudication of those issues; in effect, asking this Court to act as an appellate court and go behind Judge Warshauer’s final order issued in 1987. I cannot act in that capacity.
This was a motion for Relief From Judgment based on extrinsic fraud upon the court. It is plainly showing on the record that these issues were never adjudicated and therefore not at risk of readjudication. All Landis was expected to do was “Vacate” this fraud so that Richard could proceed with a criminal action against the offenders.
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http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t63c003.htm
SECTION 63-3-530. Jurisdiction in domestic matters.
(A) The family court has EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION:
(25) to modify or VACATE any order issued by the court;
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15624257523578678835&q=Bateman+v.+Rouse&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Bateman v. Rouse, App. Ct. (2004) Op. No. 3792
An alleged divorce of 1983 was challenged in a 1996 motion to vacate the order of divorce and in 1997 the family court declared the 1983 divorce decree void ab initio due to fraud upon the court.
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There was a fourteen (14) year span between the alleged divorce and the motion to vacate in both this case and Richard’s case—and both cases occurred in the Charleston County family court.
This Court does have the capacity to review previous Orders pertaining to issues of custody, child support, visitation, and other issues relating to the welfare of the child, or alimony or spousal support, had it been ordered.
“had it been ordered”, interesting choice of words. Susan’s sham decree of divorce plainly shows that these were not adjudicated by Warshauer. Susan’s entire history of success in this fraud hinged on no more than an alleged agreement which did not and could not exist in fact or law.
In those cases, the Court’s right of review is limited to situations involving allegations of substantially changed circumstances.
I find that the Complaint in this case does not raise any allegations of substantially changed circumstances. The circumstances that have been alleged are circumstances that existed at the time this matter was decided in 1987. Accordingly, the allegations in the Complaint are not properly before me. There is no cause of action stated or predicated on any substantially changed circumstances.
Landis plainly knew and recited the facts of Richard’s complaint and demonstrated he knew this was a Rule 60(b)(4)&(5) motion for Relief From Judgment based on extrinsic fraud upon the court. Landis had a duty to know and therefore did know and was duly instructed that this court had the authority to “Vacate” this fraud and any and all subsequent frauds stemming from it.
Landis abused his discretion and improperly dismissed Richard’s motion on allegations of ‘res judicata’ which were not and could not be supported by facts and law involved in this case.
THEREFORE for the reasons hereinabove stated, for the fact that the issues raised in the Complaint are res judicata and for the fact that there has been no cause of action stated regarding substantially changed circumstances upon which this Court could review and modify the Order of Judge Warshauer,
The only thing required of this court was to ‘vacate’ their frauds. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17194720022847030702&q=vacation+of+order&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Arnold v. Arnold, 328 SE 2d 924 - SC: Court of Appeals 1985 Joseph S. Mendelsohn, and Robert N. Rosen, of Rosen, Oberman & Rosen, Charleston, for appellant. The trial court made no determination whether there existed a genuine issue of fact regarding the fraud surrounding the rendition of the October order. This was error as res judicata would not preclude vacation of the order if it was otherwise vitiated by the requisite fraud.[2] Likewise, the application by the trial judge of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar the husband's paternity claim is inappropriate. Unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel requires an issue to have actually been determined to preclude its subsequent relitigation. Lowe v. Clayton, supra. Here, there is no contention that the parties actually litigated the question of paternity in the prior suit.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Nix v. Columbia Staffing, Inc., 471 SE 2d 718 - SC: Court of Appeals 1996, Furthermore, lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, can be raised for the first time on appeal, and can be raised sua sponte by the court. Ex parte Reichlyn, 310 S.C. 495, 427 S.E.2d 661 (1993); Hallums v. Bowens, ___ S.C. ___, 428 S.E.2d 894 (Ct.App.1993).
IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed on behalf of the Respondent is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition may not raise the allegations contained in his Complaint in the hearing of Respondent’s Rule To Show Cause motion scheduled to be heard on May 16, 2001.
This is an outrage. http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7735687623057249298&q=crime+of+moral+turpitude&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004 State v. Horton, 248 SE 2d 263 - SC: Supreme Court 1978 (An act in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951); Iowa State Bar Association v. Kraschel, 260 Iowa 187, 148 N.W. (2d) 621 (1967).)

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of May, 2001.
_________________________________
THE HONORABLE JACK A. LANDIS
Judge of the Family Court
Ninth Judicial Circuit
Charleston, South Carolina.

ATTEST: A TRUE COPY
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG (SEAL)
CLERK, FAMILY COURT
By Hazel S. Smalls
DEPUTY CLERK

===============================================================

I had suspected that this was a criminal industry under guise of a family court. Jack Landis demonstrated to me that I was right. I was left to continue investigating this matter on my own and hope that I could uncover something that would motivate one of the many law enforcement offices I had repeatedly contacted to pay attention to what was happening. All I got was – ignored – a clear indication to me that ‘FRAUD’ was involved in more than Susan’s case and it went future up the food chain than I had suspected.

===============================================================

The Following letter was sent to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. It was alleged to have been lost in the mail. I then emailed it to them and got ignored.
I emailed a similar type of letter to all members of the state legislature and simply got referred to Chip Campsen for assistance which never came.
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Let me repeat myself … It is alleged and believed that sometime in 2001-2002 someone from the Charleston County family court did contact a member of the S.C. Legislature possibly Chip Campsen to push for a change in S.C. Code § 40-5-80 deleting the portion of that code under which I proceeded with Richard’s motion to “Vacate” all orders procured through fraud. (S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-80 (1986): yada, yada, yada.
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14955031684952914278&q=unauthorized+practice+of+law&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002
In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 SE 2d 123 - SC: Supreme Court 1992
The Constitution commits to this Court the duty to regulate the practice of law in South Carolina. S.C. Const. art. V, § 4; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-10- (1986). We take this opportunity to clarify certain practices which we hold do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
First, we recognize the validity of the principle found in S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-80 (1986): any individual may represent another individual before any tribunal, if (1) the tribunal approves of the representation and (2) the representative is not compensated for his services.

===============================================================

Lillian Smith Collette
1002 Pinto Court
Hanahan, SC 29410
Date: July 16, 2007
Telephone number: (843) 740-5472
E-mail: lillycollette@bellsouth.net

Reginald I. Lloyd
United States Attorney
151 Meeting Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 978
Charleston, S.C. 29402

Re.: The U.S. Attorney’s Office has jurisdiction in this criminal complaint through the Social Security Act, violations of federal law and violations of constitutional rights. No statute of limitations applies under the facts of this case.

Dear Mr. Lloyd:

I am Lillian Smith Collette (hereinafter Lilly) the wife of Richard Stanley Collette (Richard). We are both permanently disabled under the Social Security guidelines and each receiving benefits. Richard suffers from multiple disabilities one of which is Bi polar disorder, hereditary with a documented family history.

Richard is a victim of multiple crimes culminating in Social Security fraud causing severe financial deprivation and emotional pain and suffering which later included and victimized Lilly. Richard has been so severely abused, exploited and intimidated by these crimes that Lilly presumes him incapable of pressing his case through fear of retaliation which has already occurred.

Richard’s Social Security disability insurance (SSDI) was knowingly in willful wanton violation of the law fraudulently garnished twice. This was retaliation under guise of failure to provide child support after Lilly’s discovery of scandalous blatant frauds committed by officers of the court and pursuing a 60(b) motion for relief on Richard’s behalf.

Lilly is filing this complaint as Richard’s wife and agent, as a subsequent victim in her own standing and as a concerned citizen aware of crimes against the laws of this state and the United States wherein all persons are harmed.

Summary of frauds

Susan Lee Rice (Susan) already three months pregnant by an unknown man did forge or caused to be forged the signature of Richard to a marriage license. Susan had the means and opportunity to know about Richard’s family history of Bi polar disorder before she committed this felony.

Susan committed this felony with intent to fraudulently take Richard’s property through a sham divorce and force him into supporting her illegitimate child for as many years as she could milk the system. Susan in fact accomplished these acts through a sham divorce fraudulently granted in the total absence of any / all jurisdiction.

Officers of the court in collusion with Susan defrauded Richard out of a hearing on the merits by merely alleging that Richard had entered into a divorce agreement with Susan. None of Susan’s false allegations were ever raised to the court for a ruling.

See, U S v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) (… there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case … the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting his case by fraud … attorney assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; the attorney corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side,-these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and a fair hearing. See Wells, Res Adjudicata, sect. 499; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Wierich v. De Zoya, 7 Ill. 385; Kent v. Ricards, 3 Md. Ch. 392; Smith v. Lowry, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 320; De Louis et al. v. Meek et al., 2 Iowa, 55.)

Susan’s forged marriage license was a felony -- not a marriage. There is no basis in law for a divorce and divorce agreement where there is no marriage.

No written agreement was ever signed by Richard and Susan. No written agreement was ever filed in the court. The falsely alleged agreement is mentioned only on the sham divorce decree, which was prepared by the attorney for Susan and only signed by the judge. The falsely alleged agreement meets none of the requirements of law.

The sham decree of divorce purported to be “the Agreement” in germane part alleges that Richard had agreed (1) “to sign over his interest in the marital property to Petitioner (Susan) as of the date of this order”; and (2) “to directly pay Petitioner Two hundred ($200.00) dollars per month as child support”.

Susan had alleged: (1) she was married to Richard; (2) property was acquired during their marriage; (3) her name was on the title to the property; and (4) she was entitled to equitable distribution of the marital property.

The reason why Susan’s attorney did not raise Susan’s pleadings for equitable distribution of marital property to the court for a ruling is blatantly obvious. The title to Richard’s property proves it was acquired five years before Susan’s marriage license forgery and Susan’s name was not on the title.

Susan had alleged: (1) she was married to Richard; and (2) she produced one child to the marriage.

The reason that Susan’s allegation of Richard’s paternity has never been raised to the court for a ruling is blatantly obvious. Susan was already three (3) months pregnant before the marriage license forgery. Susan is self-declared and known to be a White person. Richard is a White person with blue eyes and dark blond hair. The child of Susan is fully Asian in appearance bearing no resemblances to Richard. Richard’s paternity of Susan’s child is a physical impossibility.

Richard’s paternity of a child has never been established. He has never been adjudicated to be the legal father of any child. He has never acknowledged paternity of any child. He has never been ordered to provide support for any named identifiable child.

See, Duckett v. Goforth, App. Ct. (May 15, 2007) Op. No. 4246 (In South Carolina, a paternity determination for the purposes of child support relates to the natural or biological relationship between father and child. See S.C. Code Ann §§ 20-7-952 through 958 (Supp. 2006). While a child born during a marriage is the presumed legitimate child of the husband, that presumption may be rebutted by a paternity determination. Douglass ex rel. Louthian v. Boyce, 344 S.C. 5, 8, 542 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (2001) (interpreting S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-952 (E) (1985)). Treating a child as a child of the family during the marriage does not rise to the level of a paternity determination in South Carolina. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the family court to address the question of … paternity in order to assure … is supported in a manner consistent with South Carolina’s legislative mandate. … the issue of paternity was never fully and finally litigated.)

The court did not issue a lawful order. The court knowingly in willful wanton violation of the law colluded and conspired in the fraudulent creation and unlawful imposition of a nonexistent agreement upon Richard.

See, Patricia Grand Hotel v. MacGuire Enterprises, App. Ct. (2007) Op. No. 4226, citing, Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1983). (the district court … does not have the power to impose a settlement agreement.) Also see, Hensley v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., App. Ct. 4th Cir. (2002) Op. No. 01-1442 (… that "hearing" consisted only of an off-the-record conference ... the court did not take any evidence, nor did it make any factual findings. … it shall afford … the opportunity to proceed with his case on the merits. *… the attorney's implied authority is limited to negotiating a settlement, not agreeing to it. See Auvil v. Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226, 229-30 (4th Cir. 1996))

Richard did not comply with this falsely alleged agreement. Susan did not seek enforcement of this knowingly fraudulent agreement for twenty seven (27) months.

Based upon the fraudulent agreement and in direct contravention of the law and the evidence Richard was illegally forced by the court, under duress of an indefinite imprisonment on contempt, to sign over full title to his property to Susan. He was illegally ordered to pay support for the unidentified child of Susan through the court.

See, Farnsworth v. Davis, Sup. Ct. (2006) Op. No. 26120 (The circuit court, therefore, ordered Farnsworth to comply with an agreement that did not exist.)

Richard was facing the same judge who was later reversed in Farnsworth.

The court did not sign or file this order for five (5) months. The court improperly changed the case file number to a new case file number and did not cross-index it back to the original case file number as required. This was an obvious act of concealment and obstruction of justice.

Susan and the court knowingly in willful wanton violation of the law fraudulently conducted numerous Rule To Show Cause (RTSC) hearings over a course of years. There has never been and could never be any lawful order issued in this case.

Lilly started unraveling the scandalous extrinsic fraud(s) in this case and filed a 60(b) (4); (5) motion for Relief From Judgment seeking to have all orders ‘vacated’ which was unlawfully dismissed in direct contravention of the law and the evidence.

Susan then fraudulently placed her illegitimate child on auxiliary benefits under Richard’s award of SSDI.

While Susan was receiving five hundred seventy five ($575.00) dollars per month in auxiliary benefits under Richard’s SSDI award for the support of her child she complained to the court that Richard was not paying the allegedly agreed upon two hundred ($200.00) dollars per month ‘through the court’.

The court seized on this excuse and knowingly in willful wanton violation of the law fraudulently garnished fifty (50%) per cent of Richard’s SSDI only to increase that garnishment to sixty five (65%) per cent under guise of failure to provide child support.

The court never had subject matter jurisdiction in the sham divorce action brought under color of law by Susan. The court never had jurisdiction over the person of Richard. The court never had jurisdiction over the property of Richard. The court abdicated / abandoned all responsibility in determining the paternity of Susan’s child and therein failed to establish jurisdiction over the child. The court never had jurisdiction to order child support.

The actions of Susan were in knowing willful wanton violations of the laws of this state and the United States and committed with intent to defraud and injure. Susan sought and received the unlawful assistance of officers of the court in her scheme of fraud. Officers of the court have knowingly willfully and wantonly aided and abetted Susan in her crimes.

The sham decree of divorce, purported to be “the Agreement” on its face is a clear and blatant violation of the 14th Amendment: “…nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”.

The poorly worded sham decree of divorce from the fictitious marriage is plainly defective on its face and in direct contravention of all established law. It is null and void ab initio bearing no weight of law.

The sham decree of divorce has served as a ruse to cloak, protect, further and condone the unlawful acts of Susan and the court. Susan and the court have unlawfully profited from operating under this bogus order. No statute of limitations can apply in this case and it remains open and ripe for criminal prosecution.

The defendants in this case are responsible for the length of time involved in bringing this case and cannot be rewarded for their years of success in their crimes. None of the defendants in this case are prejudiced by the length of time involved in bringing this case.

The defendants never had and cannot present any witnesses or evidence which can overcome the charges of forgery of a marriage license. The defendants never had and cannot present any witnesses or evidence which can overcome the multiple charges of fraud.

The evidence against the defendants is a matter of readily available and easily comprehended public record and stands on its face without necessitating an undue need for witnesses of potentially compromised memory.

The court has illegally profited through this scheme of fraud for years. Susan has illegally received years of untaxed profit through this fraud. Richard has suffered years of abuse, exploitation, personal and financial damages through this fraud. Lilly has endured years of emotional pain and suffering and been illegally deprived of the full financial support of her husband.

Richard is entitled to full restitution with interest of all funds that Susan and codefendants have unlawfully received. Lilly is entitled to full restitution with interest of all funds that would have rightfully been hers as the wife of Richard. Richard is entitled to full correction of any and all public records touching upon the frauds in this case inclusive of arrest records, credit histories and birth records. Richard and Lilly are entitled to punitive damages for the years of pain and suffering caused by the frauds in this case.

Lilly is the primary reporter of facts in this complaint which stands firmly on the evidence. Attached is a timeline and list of events by and through which the injuries occurred with citations of law.

Lilly Collette: __________________________

===============================================================

I am providing two ex parte letters from Susan to the family court found in the case file records—which were available to any judge reviewing the case. Once again I’ll follow it with a duplicate bearing my work notes.

===============================================================

Susan's 1996 self incriminating letter to Paul W. Garfinkle:

640 Birgham Place
Lake Mary, FL 32746
March 25, 1996

The Honorable Paul W. Garfinkle
Family Court Judge
2 Courthouse Square
Charleston, SC 29415

RE: Case Number 90-DR-10-02881
Collette v. Collette

Dear Judge Garfinkle:

On 3-19-96, my former husband, Richard S. Collette, appeared before you on a civil contempt order for failure to pay child support. On December 18, 1995 he was ordered by Judge Judy Bridges to pay arrearage in the amount of $4,586.00 on or by Janury 1, 1996. Additionally, he was to resume the monthly support payments of $320.00. After failing to do either, he appeared before you last week with his attorney, a counselor from the Department of Mental Health, and his sister. After listening to their sad tales of Richard’s mental illness and inability to work, you postponed a ruling so that you could investigate and research this case more fully. I urge you to consider the following information before issuing your ruling;

. In the letter of 9-29-95 from the SC Department of Mental Health to Judge Bridges, paragraph 4 lists Richard’s numerous hospitalizations dating back to 1985. It fails to point out, however, that “Bipolar Disorder” was never diagnosed by any of the professionals at the various hospitals until July 1995.

. Paragraph 5 of the same letter states that Richard is unable to work due to many symptoms associated with his disorder. It is important to note that of the many jobs Richard has lost since our divorce, none were the result of mental illness, but rather were caused by Richard’s willful and continued use of alcohol and drugs. His most recent job ended abruptly when his employer did a random drug screen which came back positive for illegal drugs. The court can easily verify this since this employer was required to withhold child support from Richard’s wages and forward to the Clerk of Court.

. I truly believe, and have been told, that this recent diagnosis of manic depression, or Bipolar Disorder, is the latest scheme contrived by Richard to;
Avoid jail
Avoid having to work
Avoid paying child support
Receive and use drugs legally
Receive “free” money from the federal government
Shirk all responsibility for his actions

. Richard spent several months last year in the Charleston County jail for failure to pay child support. I am unaware of his suffering any ill effects, mental or otherwise, during his incarceration. On the contrary, he was in a work-release program and allowed to leave each evening to report to a job in Mt. Pleasant. The incentive was there for him to go to work regularly and pay child support. It was the first time and last time he paid support for our son on ant type of regular, consistent basis. Of course this ended shortly after his release.

As I stated to you on 3-19-96, I do not deny that Richard has emotional problems but it is my belief that they are self inflicted and result solely from his willful drug and alcohol abuse. Please refer to my letter to Judge Bridges dated 10-27-93, and you will see that this pattern of behavior has remained unchanged. He has the ability but not the desire to find and keep a job. He is educated, holding a civil engineering degree, has family support, and has had numerous opportunities to lead a productive life. Since March of 1986, the care and support of our son has been a responsibility that Richard refuses to acknowledge. I have accepted total responsibility for ten years now, never being able to rely on Richard’s help in any area of our son’s upbringing. Support payments have always been inconsistent, if at all and it has led to numerous financial hardships for our son and me. The support Richard has been ordered to pay, which amounts to $73.00 per week, is not a great deal of money but it would certainly help with extra expenses like braces, medical bills, sporting activities, etc. It is extremely disheartening to know that Richard would rather pay an attorney to appear with him in court than to contribute anything to the care of his only child. I am hoping you will recognize the inequity in this case and will rule accordingly.

Sincerely,
Susan R. Collette
_______________________________________________________________________

Susan's 1996 self incriminating letter to Paul W. Garfinkle:
WORK NOTES:

640 Birgham Place
Lake Mary, FL 32746
March 25, 1996

The Honorable Paul W. Garfinkle
Family Court Judge
2 Courthouse Square
Charleston, SC 29415

RE: Case Number 90-DR-10-02881
Collette v. Collette

Dear Judge Garfinkle:

On 3-19-96, my former husband, Richard S. Collette, appeared before you on a civil contempt order for failure to pay child support.

Child support which had never been ordered and could never be lawfully ordered.
Susan was Three months pregnant by an unknown man when she Forged the signature of Richard to a marriage license and Six months after her Forgery Susan gave birth to a fully Asian featured son. Susan and Richard are both White. Susan was never married to Richard and he physically could not have sired her illegitimate child.

On December 18, 1995 he was ordered by Judge Judy Bridges to pay arrearage in the amount of $4,586.00 on or by January 1, 1996. Additionally, he was to resume the monthly support payments of $320.00. After failing to do either, he appeared before you last week with his attorney, a counselor from the Department of Mental Health, and his sister. After listening to their sad tales of Richard’s mental illness and inability to work, you postponed a ruling so that you could investigate and research this case more fully. I urge you to consider the following information before issuing your ruling;

All of Susan’s Rule to Show Cause hearings over the years for failure to pay child support stemmed from her 1987 sham decree of divorce under color of law (case file number 87-DR-10-0294) which is alleged to be the actual agreement of Richard to pay Susan $200.00 per month “as” child support.
Garfinkle had a duty to know and therefore did know of his ‘responsibility’ to review that document. Nowhere on that document is any child identified as the child of a marriage, or identified by name, date of birth or even gender as a child of Richard’s to whom any duty of support was owed.

. In the letter of 9-29-95 from the SC Department of Mental Health to Judge Bridges, paragraph 4 lists Richard’s numerous hospitalizations dating back to 1985.

Susan, with the assistance of her atty. Lon Shull of Rosen, Rosen and Hagood and Dermatologist Mariane Way Rosen, did illegally have Richard sent to the State mental hospital August 14, 1985 on the literal grounds that “He ranted and raved at his wife for hours”, compounded by Susan’s unsupported allegations of alcohol and drug abuse.
As Susan’s January 1987 grounds for divorce were unsupported allegations of alcohol and drug abuse, it can reasonably be deduced that Richard was illegally committed to the State hospital to lay a foundation for Susan’s sham divorce from her nonexistent marriage. Lon Shull represented Susan in this sham divorce.

It fails to point out, however, that “Bipolar Disorder” was never diagnosed by any of the professionals at the various hospitals until July 1995.

It more importantly fails to point out the criminal role that Susan, Shull and Rosen played in this and their interfering with Richard’s right to a timely—and accurate—diagnosis and treatment.
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http://www.familyaware.org/expertprofiles/drghaemi.asp
Is bipolar disorder hereditary?
Yes, bipolar disorder runs in families; it is the most genetic major psychiatric condition. It is more genetic than schizophrenia and major depression. The onset for bipolar disorder is late teens, compared to major depression, in which the onset is usually in the late 20s or early 30s. Nassir Ghaemi, M.D. Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School and Director of the Bipolar Disorder Research Program at Cambridge Hospital.

. Paragraph 5 of the same letter states that Richard is unable to work due to many symptoms associated with his disorder. It is important to note that of the many jobs Richard has lost since our divorce, none were the result of mental illness, but rather were caused by Richard’s willful and continued use of alcohol and drugs. His most recent job ended abruptly when his employer did a random drug screen which came back positive for illegal drugs. The court can easily verify this since this employer was required to withhold child support from Richard’s wages and forward to the Clerk of Court.

. I truly believe, and have been told, that this recent diagnosis of manic depression, or Bipolar Disorder, is the latest scheme contrived by Richard to;
Avoid jail
Avoid having to work
Avoid paying child support
Receive and use drugs legally
Receive “free” money from the federal government
Shirk all responsibility for his actions

The only “scheme” in this case is Susan’s scheme to defraud and injure Richard and his family.

Susan admitted on the record that she had no personal knowledge concerning Richard (since the separation of 1986) -- it was all “hearsay” (June 13, 2001 transcript page 23, lines 17-20).

. Richard spent several months last year in the Charleston County jail for failure to pay child support. I am unaware of his suffering any ill effects, mental or otherwise, during his incarceration. On the contrary, he was in a work-release program and allowed to leave each evening to report to a job in Mt. Pleasant. The incentive was there for him to go to work regularly and pay child support. It was the first time and last time he paid support for our son on any type of regular, consistent basis. Of course this ended shortly after his release.

As I stated to you on 3-19-96, I do not deny that Richard has emotional problems but it is my belief that they are self inflicted and result solely from his willful drug and alcohol abuse. Please refer to my letter to Judge Bridges dated 10-27-93, and you will see that this pattern of behavior has remained unchanged.

Susan has a self documented pattern of Ex Parte written communication with the judges of this court as documented from her letters which were retrieved from the court’s records and accessible to all.

He has the ability but not the desire to find and keep a job. He is educated, holding a civil engineering degree, has family support, and has had numerous opportunities to lead a productive life. Since March of 1986, the care and support of our son has been a responsibility that Richard refuses to acknowledge. I have accepted total responsibility for ten years now, never being able to rely on Richard’s help in any area of our son’s upbringing.

Susan verifies that Richard has refused to acknowledge any responsibility for ‘her’ son—and she has accepted full responsibility. Susan’s child was born on October 25, 1984 and would have been seventeen months of age in March 1986.

Support payments have always been inconsistent, if at all and it has led to numerous financial hardships for our son and me. The support Richard has been ordered to pay, which amounts to $73.00 per week, is not a great deal of money but it would certainly help with extra expenses like braces, medical bills, sporting activities, etc. It is extremely disheartening to know that Richard would rather pay an attorney to appear with him in court than to contribute anything to the care of his only child.

Susan confirms her knowledge that Richard has had no other children. Then she falsely accuses Richard of the physical impossibility of siring her Asian child.
Richard has never been adjudicated to be the father of any child.

I am hoping you will recognize the inequity in this case and will rule accordingly.

The only ‘inequity’ in this case is the ones perpetrated against Richard and his family by Susan and officers of the court.

Sincerely,
Susan R. Collette

_______________________________________________________________________

Susan's 1996 self incriminating letter to Judy Bridges:

640 Birgham Place
Lake Mary, FL 32746
November 30, 1996

The Honorable Judy C. Bridges
Charleston County Family Court
PO Box 934
Charleston, SC 29402

RE: Collette v. Collette
Case Number 96-DR-10-5482, formerly Case Number 96-DR-10-2881

Dear Judge Bridges:

On October 28, 1996, I received a summons to appear and defend a complaint filed by my former husband, Richard Collette. After taking time off from work and making the seven hour trip to Charleston, I was informed that the hearing had been continued. I did not receive this information until the morning of the scheduled hearing, on November 6, 1996. I was extremely ill at the time, but made the trip anyway, hoping for some resolution.

After returning home to Florida, my illness continued to worsen. I was admitted to the hospital on November 19, 1996 and diagnosed with viral cardiomyopathy. I was released from the hospital the following weekend but have since been readmitted and remain hospitalized today. I am under the care of a cardiologist and it is his opinion that I will not be able to make the trip for the hearing which has been scheduled for December 4, 1996. Please find the attached letter from Dr. Gomez stating such. Therefore, I respectfully request that another continuance be granted until such time as I am capable of traveling.

In the event a continuance is not granted and the complaint is heard, I would like to address several issues. These include errors and omissions in the following paragraphs of the Complaint;

TWO: The complaint states that “at the time of the original order, the Plaintiff was earning a substantial income.” Please refer to the attached copy of the final order, paragraph 4, which shows Richard’s net income as zero. I do not see how this can be considered “substantial” by any measure.

THREE: The complaint states that Richard has been diagnosed as Bi-Polar and manic depressant. Per the records signed by Dr. Wanda K. Watts, M.D., his discharge diagnosis on July 6, 1995 was;

Axis 1: Alcohol Dependence
Polysubstance Abuse
Bipolar Disorder-Manic Type.

The complaint fails to mention the first two findings

FOUR: Richard believes that his child support obligation should be terminated or reduced. Your honor, again referring to the original order, Richard agreed to pay $200.00 per month as child support. This amounts to $46.15 per week. This is not an excessive amount by any means. In addition, he agreed to provide health and major medical insurance for our son. It was only after failing to do so that he was ordered by Judge Larry Paterson to begin paying $80.00 per month to cover my cost for providing the coverage. On July 6, 1990 he appeared before you and agreed to begin paying the sum of $329.86 per month; ($200.00 for child support and $129.86 for insurance premiums). At the same hearing, he further agreed to pay any and all increases in premiums. Your order was signed July 16, 1990.

FIVE: The Complaint states that Richard is “scheduled” to begin vocational rehabilitation. He has by now completed this and should be fully aware of their findings as to his employment capabilities.

SEVEN: For the same reason as stated above, I do not believe his arrearages should be held in abeyance.

If any additional information is needed before a determination can be made concerning my request for a continuance, please call my home number. If I am still hospitalized, my Mother can give you the phone and room number of the hospital. I apologize for any inconvenience this might cause the court or the Plaintiff, but unfortunately, it is beyond my control. Awaiting your reply, I remain,
Sincerely,

Susan R. Collette

Attachments

_______________________________________________________________________

WORK NOTES:

640 Birgham Place
Lake Mary, FL 32746
November 30, 1996

The Honorable Judy C. Bridges
Charleston County Family Court
PO Box 934
Charleston, SC 29402

RE: Collette v. Collette
Case Number 96-DR-10-5482, formerly Case Number 96-DR-10-2881

Susan incorrectly gives case file number 90-DR-10-002881 as “96-DR-10-2881”.
The present action of which Susan speaks is 96-DR-10-5482.
Susan has attached a copy of her 1987 sham decree of divorce signed by B.J. Warshauer upon which any / all subsequent orders rely and the case file number for that is 87-DR-10-0294.
While the court is required to and does cross-reference case file numbers in the disposition of cases before it—the docket history of all hearings under Collette v. Collette inexplicably fail to show any of the required cross-referencing.

Dear Judge Bridges:

On October 28, 1996, I received a summons to appear and defend a complaint filed by my former husband, Richard Collette.

Susan forged the signature of Richard S. Collette to a marriage license—forgery never morphs into a marriage. Richard was never her husband, just her victim.

After taking time off from work and making the seven hour trip to Charleston, I was informed that the hearing had been continued. I did not receive this information until the morning of the scheduled hearing, on November 6, 1996. I was extremely ill at the time, but made the trip anyway, hoping for some resolution.

Susan fails to mention the hearing was continued because Richard was in the hospital recovering from an incident of sudden death and the surgical implantation of an ICD to keep his heart from stopping again.

After returning home to Florida, my illness continued to worsen. I was admitted to the hospital on November 19, 1996 and diagnosed with viral cardiomyopathy.

On November 6, 1996 Susan discovered Richard was in the hospital because of a cardiac condition. Thirteen days later on November 19, 1996 Susan was admitted to the hospital on a newly alleged cardiac condition.

I was released from the hospital the following weekend but have since been readmitted and remain hospitalized today.

Susan alleges she is conducting her business from her hospital bed.

I am under the care of a cardiologist and it is his opinion that I will not be able to make the trip for the hearing which has been scheduled for December 4, 1996. Please find the attached letter from Dr. Gomez stating such. Therefore, I respectfully request that another continuance be granted until such time as I am capable of traveling.

In the event a continuance is not granted and the complaint is heard, I would like to address several issues. These include errors and omissions in the following paragraphs of the Complaint;

TWO: The complaint states that “at the time of the original order, the Plaintiff was earning a substantial income.” Please refer to the attached copy of the final order, paragraph 4, which shows Richard’s net income as zero. I do not see how this can be considered “substantial” by any measure.

Susan makes specific mention to her final order of divorce and points out an error of counsel pertaining to Richard’s income. Susan knew Richard’s income was zero.

THREE: The complaint states that Richard has been diagnosed as Bi-Polar and manic depressant. Per the records signed by Dr. Wanda K. Watts, M.D., his discharge diagnosis on July 6, 1995 was;
Axis 1: Alcohol Dependence
Polysubstance Abuse
Bipolar Disorder-Manic Type.
The complaint fails to mention the first two findings

Any one of these three conditions could compromise anyone’s ability to lucidly enter into an agreement. Susan herein points out her belief that Richard suffers from all three conditions. Susan has consistently down-played any diagnosis of mental illness by licensed Psychiatrists while she has placed all her emphasis on her allegations of alcohol dependence and poly-substance abuse since at least August 14, 1985. Susan has never provided any supporting evidence.

FOUR: Richard believes that his child support obligation should be terminated or reduced. Your honor, again referring to the original order, Richard agreed to pay $200.00 per month as child support.

Susan refers to her final order of divorce and has provided a copy for Bridges to review. Susan alleges this document to be Richard’s “Agreement” to pay $200.00 per month as child support.

(a) It is plain on the face of this document that paternity has never been adjudicated: No child identified by name, age or gender has been found to be a child of any marriage to Richard and to whom Richard may owe any duty of support.
(b) Custody has not even been mentioned.
(c) No court reporter was present at this alleged final hearing.
THIS DOCUMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN AGREEMENT IN COMPLIANCE WITH ANY LAW ON AGREEMENTS. IT IS CORRECTLY PRESUMED WITHIN THE INTENT OF THE LAW THAT THIS LETTER CONSTITUTED AMPLE WARNING TO THE COURT OF NEGLIGENCE AND / OR FRAUD WHICH WARRANTED FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

This amounts to $46.15 per week. This is not an excessive amount by any means. In addition, he agreed to provide health and major medical insurance for our son. It was only after failing to do so that he was ordered by Judge Larry Paterson to begin paying $80.00 per month to cover my cost for providing the coverage.

Susan admits that Richard had to be court ordered by Patterson (November 6, 1989) into compliance with the alleged Agreement contained on the (September 1987) order of Warshauer. Susan therein documents her awareness that Richard was not in agreement and he was demonstrating it.
Susan admits Richard was ordered (1989) to provide her with funds so that she could buy a policy of health insurance covering her child. The court record shows Susan received that money starting April 1990.
Susan’s Patient Financial History on her child does not show any policy of health insurance on her child until May 26, 1995.
(June 13, 2001 Susan alleges that Richard was responsible for providing her with that ‘policy’ of insurance—which she had been fraudulently receiving funds to purchase herself.)

On July 6, 1990 he appeared before you and agreed to begin paying the sum of $329.86 per month; ($200.00 for child support and $129.86 for insurance premiums). At the same hearing, he further agreed to pay any and all increases in premiums. Your order was signed July 16, 1990.

The November 6, 1989 order of Patterson was obviously not signed and filed with the court until April 1, 1990 —five months after the hearing date. It was improperly given a new case file number (90-DR-10-002881) which was not cross-referenced back to the original case file number (87-DR-10-0294).
Bridges had a duty to know and therefore did know that the order of Patterson had expired before he signed and filed it—and it stemmed from the original fraud of 1987.
Bridges increased the $80.00 premium payments to $129.86 (+) a month on July 16, 1990

FIVE: The Complaint states that Richard is “scheduled” to begin vocational rehabilitation. He has by now completed this and should be fully aware of their findings as to his employment capabilities.

SEVEN: For the same reason as stated above, I do not believe his arrearages should be held in abeyance.

If any additional information is needed before a determination can be made concerning my request for a continuance, please call my home number. If I am still hospitalized, my Mother can give you the phone and room number of the hospital. I apologize for any inconvenience this might cause the court or the Plaintiff, but unfortunately, it is beyond my control. Awaiting your reply, I remain,
Sincerely,

Susan R. Collette

Attachments

===============================================================

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9668462679190108315&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&kqfp=10516624089901922579&kql=139&kqpfp=7636088315946720767#kq Sargeant v. Sargeant, 495 P. 2d 618 - Nev: Supreme Court 1972 (The trial court instead sought to support the $50,000 trust fund on the oral agreement to support the boy. This, of course, establishes their standing in the place of a parent (loco parentis) but one may abandon the burdens attendant upon such status at any time. Farris v. Farris, 58 Wash.2d 837, 365 P.2d 14 (1961); Franklin v. Franklin, 75 Ariz. 151, 253 P.2d 337 (1953); Chestnut v. Chestnut, 247 S.C. 332, 147 S.E.2d 269 (1966); see also 18 S.C.L.Rev. 541 (1966). Nor will bare promises of future support convert this status to a degree of permanence on the theory that the husband is estopped from withdrawing from those promises. Fuller v. Fuller, supra; cf. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App.2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 90 A.L.R.2d 569 (1961); also People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495 (1968); Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis.2d 599, 157 N.W.2d 660 (1968); Wilson v. Wilson, 14 Ohio App.2d 148, 237 N.E.2d 421, 426 (1968)

Susan’s case throughout its entire history has rested exclusively on false allegations and conclusory arguments without ever presenting any evidence, corroborating testimony or citations of supporting law. Susan admitted on the record that she had no personal knowledge concerning Richard (since the separation of 1986) -- it was all “hearsay” (June 13, 2001 transcript page 23, lines 17-20).

===============================================================

My friend David Bardes facilitated contact with the still illegitimate son of Susan traveling under the alias of prentiss collette and who is in fact John Doe Rice.
I issued several warnings to him that Susan’s fraud has been discovered. He was found to have participated in that fraud after reaching age of majority and to have profited from it. He has also been provided with a wealth of law to convince him that he and his mother are in the wrong. Please observe this man’s conduct.

===============================================================

emails with John Doe Rice (alias, Prentiss Collette):

Between You and Prentiss Collette
September 1, 2009 at 8:31am
Are you serious!!!! you have the nerve to disrespect my family and ask to be my friend after my father is not man enough to stand up for his responsibilities... i read the whole thing and sorry i am better then that and i respect my elders so your lucky my mother tought me right or else this letter would be a lot more nasty
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=628405884#!/?sk=messages&tid=442643919761
Paternity ???
Between Prentiss Collette and You

Lilly S. Collette
May 3, 2010 at 4:24pm
Who's your daddy???
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

May 3, 2010 at 4:48pm
i have 2 parents my mom and my mom cause my low life father is probably laying in a gutter somewhere from overdosing on all the drugs. or karma just got him and hopefully he is not on earth anymore. and btw please dont contact me cause your husband is too scared to contact me himself
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lilly S. Collette
May 3 at 6:18pm
Lilly Collette Says:
May 3rd, 2010 at 02:57 pm
Look at my FaceBook page
http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=628405884

See the 25 year old Asian man who believed a blue eyed blond was his daddy because his White mommie said so.

Maury, HELP!!!
7 Best Maury Povich Paternity Result Reactions
www.holytaco.com
If there's anything that's more excellent than having sex with a woman, it's finding out later that you did NOT father her bastard child. If
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Lilly S. Collette
May 3 at 6:38pm
My husband is not afraid of you he simply has no desire or duty to speak directly with you. Why should he? You absolutely do know that he is not your father.
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May 3 at 6:44pm
lol get a life you have nothing better to do but make peoples lives worse but im better then that i am a full time student going for a physical therapy degree. i live in a nice apartment while you live in a trailer. so i would appreciate it if you would get off my back and let me concentrate on my education because i do not need this stress. and your right he is not my father because cowards dont run in the family im 6 foot 2 inches 200 lbs and like i said im a respectful person but if i keep getting these emails i will take action and i do have the address so from what my mom tought me you have a nice day and what i get from my fathers side u can go to hell. p.s. u married a coward who runs from his problems and collects money from the govt to feed his junki habit. and your friend is very nice who emailed me just next time make sure he picks up the phone so i can talk to him
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May 3 at 6:49pm
o i definitely hope he is not so lets just forget all this ever happend and go on with our lives like i said im in school and i dont need this childish drama
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Lilly S. Collette
May 3 at 7:24pm
You need to get your facts straight. My husband is not your father. You are not Richard Prentiss Collette. You are John Doe Rice the illegitemate child of Susan Lee Rice.

And under the laws of South Carolina and the United States you have knowingly applied a fraudulent name on your college application. You need to clean up your act before you get in any deeper.

Cowards do run in your maternal line along with thieves and liars. My husband and I do not drink, smoke or do drugs.

Do not threaten me.
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May 3 at 9:13pm
Lol grow up I'm a college student and I home my dad dies a painful death wait ur right I do have a dad and he is there for me when I need him not a junky so with all do respect please leave me alone my life is better without both of u interfearing my life I have priorties with school and my real family so if u don't leave me alone I'll make this a federal matter and trust me it will happen so please leave me alone
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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Lilly S. Collette
May 4 at 4:29am
Your bellicose ill wishes for your unknown biological father are irrelevant to me as you know my husband is not your biological or legal father.

I quote you, […] “ur right I do have a dad and he is there for me when I need him” […]. Who is that man? How long has he served in the capacity of your father? What relation is he to you?

I am not wasting my time asking you what legal evidence you may have to support your absurd contention that my husband may have sired you. I already know there is none.

I am not interfering in your life. I am providing you with an opportunity to be a man and start working on reparations for the frauds of your mother and you.

What part of “Do not threaten me” did you fail to comprehend?
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Lilly S. Collette
May 4 at 7:03am
http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t44c063.htm
SECTION 44-63-161. Unlawful acts; penalties.
(A) It is unlawful for a person: … (2) to wilfully make a false statement in a certificate, … or to wilfully supply false information … (4) to wilfully obtain, possess, use, furnish to another, … for the purpose of deception, a certificate, … (B) A person who violates a provision of item (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (A) is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

SC Code. § 44-63-165. Birth certificate of illegitimate child to be prepared when father acknowledges paternity. A certificate must be prepared for a child born out of wedlock in this State to include the name of the father upon receipt of a sworn acknowledgment of paternity signed by both parents to include the surname by which the child is to be known.

(Richard Collette was never married to Susan Rice and obviously not the biological parent of her illegitimate child. Susan had no authority under the laws of this state -- or through Richard -- to use Richard’s surname for her illegitimate child.
Susan unlawfully applied the unauthorized alias of “Richard Prentiss Collette” to her illegitimate child with intent to defraud and injure therein denying her child all right legal / supposed to the use of the name (fraud being a legal bar to the use of a name). Susan’s illegitimate child was denied a lawful name due to Susan’s refusal to pursue adjudication of paternity and the extrinsic fraud of Susan and officers of the court.
The illegitimate child of Susan Lee Rice is and remains by law JOHN DOE RICE.)

See, Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. 1968) (requisite prejudice had not been shown where it was alleged that allowing the former husband to deny paternity would illegitimize the child; court observed that because the child's natural father had neither married the child's mother nor acknowledged paternity, the child was and always had been illegitimate).
Also see, McMillian by McMillian v. Heckler, 759 F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir. 1985) [I]t is clear that Congress intended that a claimant invoking either of the alternative means of establishing entitlement provided by § 416(h)(3)(C) should be put to proving as one ultimate fact that the insured was his natural parent.
S.C. Code of Laws Title 44 Chapter 63 Vital Statistics - www.scstatehouse.gov-LPITS
www.scstatehouse.net
Category: BillNumber Legislation Budget CodeofLaws CodeofRegulations Constitution HouseJournals SenateJournals LPITSBillSummary Search for:
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Lilly S. Collette
The alleged richard prentiss collette is in fact John Doe Rice.
IfJ. D. Rice wishes to file a federal case -- Oh Well ...
May 4 at 11:01am •
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Lilly S. Collette
Wednesday, May 5, 2010.
I see that the bastard of Susan Lee Rice fraudulently posing as richard prentiss collette has taken down his FaceBook page:

http://www.facebook.com/prentiss.collette
The page you requested was not found. ... See More
May 5 at 8:23am •
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Lilly S. Collette
Oh my GAWD (!) J.D. Rice (a/k/a/ prentiss) has also vanished from:
http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=1083917032&ref=ts
May 5 at 8:56am •
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Lilly S. Collette
And this was the man that J. D. Rice (a/k/a/ prentiss) had said was his dad and was always there for him.

I don't know why this man has minimized his previously used name of Rupert Lawrence Ali Meghnot to Rupert Meghnot. What a shame, it sounded so romantic.
May 5 at 9:09am •
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Lilly S. Collette

Gastronomic Alert
If anyone wishes to send me a lawyer,
please don’t forget the salt and pepper.
Thank you.
May 5 at 9:14am
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Lilly S. Collette
Sooo, the 6 foot 2 inch 200 pound J. D. Rice (a/k/a/ prentiss) who slanders and mocks his victims for cowardice—turns tail and runs to hide when he is confronted by one of his victims.

Interesting.
May 5 at 4:00pm •
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Lilly S. Collette
AND ANOTHER THING ...

If John Doe Rice bastard son of Susan Lee Rice is so proid of his mammy -- why has he never published a picture of her???

Is he afraid that everyone will see just how "WHITE" she is and realize that he damn sure wasn't sired by a "WHITE" man? ... See More
May 7 at 4:40pm
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Lilly S. Collette
Oh Dear, I do so hope that Mr. Meghnot is not upset with me.
Jeepers. I even clicked off that I liked the Full Sail University web site where he says he is employed to teach Project Management in the Game Design Master of Science (GDMS) program.
http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=1083917032&ref=ts#!/pages/Full-Sail-University/106901429342286

What else could I do. (Hmmm)
May 8 at 7:42am •
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Lilly S. Collette

John Doe Rice (a/k/a/ pretiss collette) the Asian bastard son of the (fat) Susan Lee Rice asked what was the probability of an Asian (like him) being 6 ft. 2 in. tall, weighing 200 lbs. and having red hairs in his beard?

See, Ed Wang who is 6 ft. 5 in. and 300 lbs.
http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news;_ylt=Artc1kpEhGzzTUumRF4ySK8dsLYF?slug=ap-nflschinesehope&print=1... See More
May 9 at 1:42pm •
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Lilly S. Collette
No wonder Susan Lee Rice Meghot doesn't put any pictures of herself on the internet.
May 9 at 1:45pm •
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Lilly S. Collette
Hey -- J. D. Rice (a/k/a/ prentiss collette).

YO MOMMA !!!

ROTFLMAO
May 9 at 3:35pm •
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Lilly S. Collette
‎26 Brooklyn L Rev 45 (1959); 38 Boston UL Rev 299 (1958); 15 Fordham L Rev 282 (1946). More euphonious terms are also being used in the statutes. "Bastard" is giving way to "illegitimate child," to "a child born out of wedlock," and to "a natural child"; "Bastardy Acts" have yielded to "Family Acts" and "Paternity Acts."

Yeah, and when the word “bastard” becomes illegal send me a memo.
May 10 at 8:59am •
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Lilly S. Collette
Tuesday, May 11, 2010

My goodness -- John Doe Rice (a/k/a/ prentiss) has his Facebook page up and running again and -- HE -- sent ME a message:

http://www.facebook.com/?sk=messages&tid=442643919761#!/?sk=messages&tid=1281204636687
well hello
May 11 at 12:07am
can you please tell me who this man is?

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Lilly S. Collette
May 11 at 3:26am
Mr. Rice, do you really expect me to identify a very small photograph of a man whose features are covered by a hat and sunglasses? I even enlarged it and still can’t make out the features. What is your point here?
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May 11 at 6:59am
Show it to him look at his past pictures
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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Lilly S. Collette
May 11 at 7:32am
Mr. Rice, if you are addressing my husband by the term “him” and “his” you may more properly address him by his name—which is Mr. Collette to you.

I repeat my previous question, “What is your point here?”

I am under no obligation to play guessing games with you. You provided a poor quality photo and you need to state who you believe these people to be.
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May 11 at 7:49am
Aka my father
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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May 11 at 7:52am
Lol wow denial so you used to be the care giver to mama I remember!!!! O yea u have 3 kids of your own that u never took care of them. Don't think you are the only one who thinks they know everything
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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Lilly S. Collette
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4795266099804194792&q=Justice+v.+Scruggs&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&as_vis=1

Justice v. Scruggs, 332 SE 2d 106 - SC: Court of Appeals 1985
[…] First Mrs. Scruggs argues Mr. Justice's social security disability benefits she receives for the children are irrelevant to the issue of his child support ... See More
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Lilly S. Collette
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14548846779455899660&q=Pinckney+v.+Warren&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&as_vis=1

Pinckney v. Warren, 544 SE 2d 620 - SC: Supreme Court 2001.

Fraudulent assertions of paternity will be much less likely to succeed, or even to arise, where proof of paternity must be established by either a court
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Lilly S. Collette
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10868979783950578390&q=Chestnut+v.+Chestnut+&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&as_vis=1

Chestnut v. Chestnut, 147 SE 2d 269 - SC: Supreme Court 1966

"One important qualification is that one merely standing in the place of a parent may abandon the burdens attendant upon such status at any time. 67 C.J.S. Parent... See More
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May 11 at 7:54am
So when are we doing this paternity test so I can prove you wrong
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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Lilly S. Collette
May 11 at 8:25am
Mr. Rice,
Given what my husband and I have endured at the hands of your mother and her pals we of course cannot trust any DNA testing done in either of our states.

You of course are free to make arrangements with the Maury Povich show and have ‘your’ paternity test done—if you are truly foolish enough to believe that you were sired by a White man.
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May 11 at 8:33am
Lol ur so ignorant and nieave have a good life lol o yea take responsabilaties for your children as well
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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Lilly S. Collette
May 11 at 6:44pm
Mr. Rice, none of your pointlessly asinine comments about me will change any of the deplorable facts of your miserable existence. I am not influenced or in anyway swayed by your innuendos that you may have information on me. No one cares.

You would be better advised to look into your own motives for knowingly allowing your -- ‘information conduit’ -- to deny you the right to your true identity. Nothing you say about me is going to change the fact that you are John Doe Rice the illegitimate son of Susan Lee Rice. Now if that bothers you then you can seek a paternity test and start checking into who your real father is.

You already know through biological (ethnic) certainty that you are not the child of a White man.
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May 11 at 8:40pm
Who is Jon doe lol that is my video game facebook name lol wow ur awsome
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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Lilly S. Collette
May 12 at 7:47am
Mr. Rice, I believe you are already aware of this nonetheless I will refresh your memory:

The White female, Susan Lee Rice, three months pregnant by an unknown Asian male, forged the name of a (disabled) White male, Richard S. Collette, to a marriage license.

Susan was assisted in this forgery and fraud by Probate court judge Shelton Parker.

Six months after Susan’s marriage license forgery she delivered a full term fully Asian featured boy. Falsely alleging herself to be Susan R. Collette she then filed for a divorce from Richard.

What is purported and captioned to be the “FINAL ORDER” in this case (87-DR-10-0294) plainly shows that no hearing on the merits had ever occurred.

Absolutely none of Susan’s false allegations were raised to the court for a ruling.

Without the exercise of any judicial discretion at all the court accepted Susan’s verbal ("VERBAL") allegations that Richard had agreed to sign over his interest in his home to Susan and to directly pay her $200.00 dollars per month for the support of her child.

Susan was assisted in this fraud by family court judge Bernard J. Warshauser and attorney Lon Shull.

Susan and her court-house-croanies have had since 1987 to present this alleged agreement -- AND WHERE IS THIS ALLEGED AGREEMENT?

It does not exist anywhere except in the fraudulent allegations of Susan.

Richard S. Collette was knowingly maliciously prosecuted for years by Susan and the family court until her -- still -- illegitimate son aged out.
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May 12 at 2:51pm
Blah blah blah both of you belong in a loony bin I'm so glad I don't have q trailor trash father because my life would of been he'll growing up but anyways we should get together for lunch some day!!!! Signed yours truley Jon doe lol.......
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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Lilly S. Collette
May 12 at 6:28pm
Mr. Rice, read this document and see if you can find your name, gender, age or any remarks that you were a child ‘born to a marriage’.
--------------------

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE FAMILY COURT
) FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL
) CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON ) CASE NO.: 87-DR-10-0294
)
SUSAN RICE COLLETTE )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) FINAL ORDER
)
RICHARD STANLEY COLLETTE, )
)
Respondent . )
______________________________)

TRIAL JUDGE: The Honorable B. J. Warshauer
HEARING DATE: SEPTEMBER 10, 1987
PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY: Lon H. Shull, III
RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEY: W. Robert Kinard

This matter comes before me for final hearing pursuant to a Petition filed by Susan Rice Collette. Present at the hearing is the Petitioner and her attorney, Lon H. Shull, III. Also present at the hearing is the Respondent and his attorney, W. Robert Kinard. Prior the hearing the attorneys advised the Court that an Agreement had been reached between the parties settling all issues except that of the divorce. The Court examined both of the parties and finds that there is no possibility of reconciliation between the parties. Subsequent to the presentation of the Agreement the Petitioner moved to amend her Petition to request a divorce on the statutory grounds of one year’s separation, a vinculo matrimonii. This Motion was joined in by the Respondent and the Court allowed the amendment of the Petition.

Based upon the representations of counsel, the testimony presented in Court and the entire case record of this matter I make the following findings of fact.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. That the parties last lived together as husband and wife in the County of Charleston, State of South Carolina in March of 1986 and that this Court has jurisdiction over all these matters.
2. That the parties have reached an Agreement the substance of which is as follows:
a. That the Respondent will transfer all his interest and ownership in the marital home to the Petitioner as of the date of this Order. The September mortgage payment shall be pro-rated between the parties. As the date of the hearing was the 10th of September, the Petitioner shall be responsible for two-thirds (2/3) of the mortgage payment and the Respondent shall be responsible for one-third (1/3) of the mortgage payment of September. That the Petitioner shall assume all responsibility for the Veteran’s Administration mortgage loan and that the Respondent does hereby warrant to the Court and to the Petitioner that there are no other encumbrances on the marital home.
b. That the Respondent shall pay unto the Petitioner Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars per month as child support. Said amount to be paid directly to the Petitioner.
c. That the Respondent shall continue to carry health and major medical insurance on the minor child and that the parties shall divide equally all medical expenses not covered by insurance.
d. Both parties waive any type of alimony now and forever.
e. Both parties waive any claim for attorneys fees against the other.
f. With regard to personal property the parties are satisfied with the division of the personal property with the exception of the Respondent’s bicycle, tools, a set of china and a bedroom suit. The Petitioner hereby agrees that the Respondent shall have ownership of those items of property in addition to any items of property he had prior to this hearing removed from the home.
g. The Petitioner expressly warrants to the Court that she has no objection to the minor child’s christening in the Catholic church.
h. That the Respondent shall have reasonable and liberal visitation including every other weekend from 6:00 PM on Friday to 6:00 PM on Sunday; alternating the major holidays of Christmas, New Years, Easter, July 4th and Thanksgiving; allowing the Respondent extended visitation in the summer as arranged by the parties and for such other times as the parties may mutually agree.
3. That at the time of this hearing, the Petitioner’s net monthly income was Two Hundred Eighty ($280.00) Dollars per month and her expenses as listed on her Financial Declaration were One Thousand One Hundred Ten ($1,110.00) Dollars.
4. That at the time of this hearing the Respondent’s net income was zero (0) and his expenses were One Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Seven ($1,197.00) Dollars per month.
5. That the Court examined both of the parties with regard to the fairness and equity of the Agreement and found that both parties agreed with the provisions of the Agreement and understood them fully and desired that the Court incorporate this Agreement into its Order.
6. That based upon the representations of the parties and the Financial Declarations filed by both parties the Court finds the Agreement is fair and equitable under the circumstances then and there prevailing at the time of the hearing.
7. That the parties have been living separate and apart on a continuous basis in excess of one year.
8. That the Petitioner presented the corroborating testimony of Ms. Flynn, the Petitioner’s sister, and that the Court finds that no collusion was entered into by the parties and that the parties have indeed been living separate and apart on a continuous basis in excess of one year.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. That the Agreement is fair and equitable and should be incorporated into this Court’s Order and Decree and be fully enforceable as such.
2. That the Petitioner is entitled to a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the statutory grounds of one year’s separation. It is therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that the Petitioner is granted a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the statutory grounds of one year’s separation and that the Agreement, as set out above, is hereby fully incorporated into the Order of this Court and enforceable as same.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

I hereby certify that I verily believe this Order to be in compliance with Rule 27(c) of the Family Court Rules.

__________________________________
THE HONORABLE B. J. WARSHAUER
JUDGE OF THE FAMILY COURT FOR
THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
This 22 day of September, 1987.
Charleston, South Carolina
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Lilly S. Collette
May 13 at 7:53am
In re. to your last comment: […] I'm so glad I don't have q trailor trash father because my life would of been he'll growing up but anyways we should get together for lunch some day!!!! […]

Mr. Rice, if you have the capacity to read and comprehend the idiotic decree of divorce that was fraudulently granted to your unmarried mother (87-DR-10-0294) you will see that you have—NO FATHER AT ALL.

All that exists there is an ALLEGED agreement—which in fact and law does NOT exist. THERE IS NO AGREEMENT.

Living in a mobile home is not a crime and it is not socially unacceptable.

Fraud is a crime. Susan Lee Rice and her pals—including you—are guilty of several crimes under her initial fraud.

I am duly informed and do believe based on your own comments and other evidence that you are of a criminal mindset therefore—WE SHALL NEVER DO LUNCH.

YOU ARE PUBLICLY NOTIFIED THAT YOU, YOUR MOTHER OR PEOPLE KNOWN TO YOU / YOUR MOTHER ARE NEVER TO APPROACH MY HUSBAND OR ME OR OUR HOME.

My only purpose for contact with you through the internet is to make you aware that crimes have been uncovered and to provide you an opportunity to be a man and start working for some resolution and recompense.
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Lilly S. Collette
May 13 at 1:11pm
What makes a family court judge’s order “judicial”?

[…] Rule 26 of South Carolina’s Family Court Rules specifically requires family court final orders and adjudications to “set forth the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the court’s decision … By signing his name to an order in a domestic relations case, the judge certifies compliance with this rule.” […] A judge’s decision only acquires legitimacy because it must be explained in writing and harmonized with existing statutes and case law. A family court judge’s final order that is based on inaccurate legal conclusions or factual findings without substantial evidentiary support is subject to reversal on appeal because it cannot be harmonized with existing law. Judicial orders affecting substantial rights (and, other than taking away a people’s freedom or their life, taking their children, money and residences are about the most important things one can take from them) require legitimacy in a democratic culture. While many family court judges scrupulously follow the mandates of Rule 26 in drafting final orders, such rigorous adherence is not as uniform as it should be. Further temporary orders contain none of the legitimizing constraints that are a hallmark of “judicial” decision making. A legal culture that puts its police powers behind judicial rulings that lack the hallmarks of judicial decision making puts its whole legitimacy into question. Many of the citizen complaints regarding family court are not the crackpot complaints of dissatisfied litigants but are merely a less analytical version of these concerns.

Gregory S. Forman, P.C.
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May 13 at 9:02pm
Can I ask u a question is ricks b day feb 14?
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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Lilly S. Collette
May 14 at 7:15am
Until such time as you -- man up -- to the plate and have public paternity testing done to prove your paternity—you are not entitled to any information about Mr. Collette, if that was who you were speaking of with your impertinent use of the name, “rick”.

Stay focused: The issue here is that -- “you have no proof of paternity”.

I have just provided you evidence that—you—have never been identified by name, age or even gender as a child of any ALLEGED marriage and—Mr. Collette—has never been named as your father.

Mr. Collette has agreed to the paternity testing if it is done publicly through a private laboratory which is not connected with South Carolina or Florida.

Given the blatant acts of extrinsic fraud criminally assisted by officers of the family court in this case Mr. Collette and I do not agree to this matter being once again brought before the obviously corrupt organization under guise of a family court.

The family court is and always was aware that they never had jurisdiction in this case from its inception as evidenced by the record.

1. Your mother never presented any evidence or testimony to support her ALLEGATION that she was married to Mr. Collette.

All she had was a FORGED marriage license.

2. Your mother never presented any evidence or testimony to support her ALLEGATION that property was acquired during this mythological marriage and she was entitled to equitable distribution.

The title to Mr. Collette’s property confirms it was purchase FIVE (5) YEARS before your mother’s FORGERY of that marriage license.

3. Your mother never presented any evidence or testimony to support her assinine ALLEGATION that you were the child of Mr. Collette.

Mr. Collette is White.
Your mother declared herself to be White. I have seen her and know her to be White appearing to be of Welch / Irish ancestory.
You are fully Asian featured.

4. And there is no presumption of paternity based on your mother’s ALLEGATIONS of a marriage in this case.

Your mother was ‘already’ three (3) months pregnant by an unknown man when she FORGED Mr. Collette’s name to a marriage license.

Mr. Collette was never allowed a hearing on the merits in this case, he has never had his 'day in court' because the evidence alone would have forced this case to be sent on to criminal court where it belonged.

Your mother, if that is indeed who she is (i.e., Lee Trevino), has stalked the innocent Mr. Collette through the corrupt family court for years on no more than FALSE ALLEGATIONS, GOSSIP and RUMORS. I have her court testimony confirming that statement. You need to stop all your stupidity and arrange for the paternity testing.
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Lilly S. Collette
May 14 at 11:07am
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13861386405198614208&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&as_vis=1&kqfp=8205302222662274379&kql=90&kqpfp=12265550540220236770#kq
In re Lake, 202 BR 751 - Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, 9th Circuit 1996
[…] A state court judgment allegedly procured through extrinsic fraud is subject to collateral attack in a court of the state that rendered the judgment or in a federal court. Heiser, 327 U.S. at 736, 66 S.Ct. at 857-58; United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 347 F.2d 48, 59 n. 9 (9th Cir.1965) (federal courts have authority to grant relief from state court judgments).

[...] Under California law, a court of equity may at any time[8] set aside a judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud. Lovato v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 151 Cal.App.3d 549, 554, 198 Cal.Rptr. 838, 840 (1984); see also Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 65; Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir.1996) (and cases cited therein). When a judgment has been obtained through fraudulent means, the policy favoring a fair adversary proceeding on the merits outweighs the public policy that underlies finality of judgments.
See McHugh v. Howard, 165 Cal.App.2d 169, 175, 331 P.2d 674 (1958) (noting that a judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud is not entitled to the protection of res judicata
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Lilly S. Collette
May 15 at 7:54am
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928). Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
"In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. [...] Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Id., at 485.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1968), Mr. Chief Justice Warren said for the Court:
"The rule also serves another vital function—`the imperative of judicial integrity.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens […]."
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Lilly S. Collette
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18366988689608369514&q=judicial+corruption&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&as_vis=1

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 US 899 - Supreme Court 1997
[...] Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through "Operation Greylord," [...]. See United States v. Maloney, 71 F. 3d 645 (CA7 1995),
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Lilly S. Collette
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5077961914482231479&q=Fuller+v.+Fuller%2C++247+A.2d+767+(D.C.+1968)+&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&as_vis=1
Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A. 2d 767 - DC: Court of Appeals 1968
Furthermore, it has not been demonstrated that the child has been prejudiced. Appellant charges that denial of the application of equitable estoppel would have the effect of illegitimatizing the child. In the absence of the marriage of appellant to the natural father and an acknowledgment of paternity by him, the child is now and always has been illegitimate and the court is powerless to remedy that status by imposing upon appellee the paternal duty of support.
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Lilly S. Collette
FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT TO MARRY
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6017011837123478801&q=material+misrepresentation+of+paternity&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&as_vis=1

Miller v. Miller, 956 P. 2d 887 - Okla: Supreme Court 1998
... See More
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Lilly S. Collette

AND OF COURSE I DO SO LIKE:

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4362809569519461083&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&as_vis=1
... See More
Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 US 238 - Supreme Court 1944
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Lilly S. Collette
May 17 at 8:28am
Susan Lee Rice was a trespasser on the property of Mr. Collette (1984) on her knowingly false allegations that he was the father of the child she was carrying. Her concocting a fraud to regain entry after Notice of Trespass does not negate the trespass—it compounds it by adding the fraud.

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7959786931192237860&q=trespass&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&as_vis=1#r[7]

Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347 - Supreme Court 1964
[…] Thus in State v. Green, 35 S. C. 266, 14 S. E. 619 (1892), […] the prosecution was not for remaining on the land after such notice but for returning later, and the court said, "under the view we take of this provision of our laws, when the owner or tenant in possession of land forbids entry thereon, any person with notice who afterwards enters such premises is liable to punishment." 35 S. C., at 268, 14 S. E., at 620. […] In sum, in the 95 years between the enactment of the statute in 1866 and the 1961 decision in the Mitchell case, the South Carolina cases construing the statute uniformly emphasized the notice-before-entry requirement, and gave not the slightest indication that that requirement could be satisfied by proof of the different act of remaining on the land after being told to leave.
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Lilly S. Collette
May 17 at 12:39pm
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.17/handbook-1710.html
1710. Does a court decree of paternity prove a child is yours?
A court decree finding that you are the child's mother or father must:
A. Identify you and the child;
B. Include a specific finding that you are the child's biological parent; and
C. Must have been issued before your death and be certified by the proper official.
Last Revised: March, 2001
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http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.17/handbook-1711.html
1711. Does a court order for support prove a child is yours?
A court order for support must:
A. Identify the child;
B. Direct you to contribute to the child's support;
C. Either name you as the child's parent or have been issued under a child support statute; and
D. Have been issued before your death.
Last Revised: March, 2001
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Lilly S. Collette
May 17 at 1:27pm
Mr. Rice, has it started sinking in yet that you have absolutely no evidence or supporting law for the asinine contention that my husband may have sired you?

I am given to understand that your White mother was the product of a White father and Japanese mother. Your mother declared herself to be White—and she definitely was White when I last saw her.

Your White mother alleged that she mated with the White Mr. Collette and produced a fully Asian child—that being you.

The only -- excuse -- offered by you or your mother for such a physical impossibility is the Japanese maternal grandmother named Kiku Rice.

Your mother and you are alleging that you are what was more commonly known as a “THROW-BACK”. Throw-backs do not exist outside of the twisted imaginations of racist and other social debris.

It is absolutely deviant and obscene to suggest that you are Asian because of the Asian genes of Kiku. There is only one way / manner in which Kiku’s genetic material could have come into play in your conception—and I find that thought as disgusting as your mother and you.
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May 17 at 2:59pm
Ok you are pissing me off time to block you lol have a good life in hell
Sent via Facebook Mobile
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Lilly S. Collette
Well I am just at a complete loss as to why the Asian John Doe Rice (fraudulently posing as the non-existent White prentiss collette) would be “pissed off” with me. Go figure.

I have done nothing but provide him law and facts exposing the frauds and appalling lies of his mother—which he knowingly participated in and benefited from.
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Lilly S. Collette
All fugly fat Asian boy (John Doe Rice) has provided here is threats, lies and insults.

Which is in FACT all his mother (Susan Lee Rice) ever brought into the criminal cartel which fraudulently goes under guise of family court.
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Lilly S. Collette

Google:
Adam Wheeler Harvard

They may even get around to checking on you Mr. Rice.
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Lilly S. Collette

John Doe Rice, obvious Asian bastard son of White Susan Lee Rice, shows cranial features indicative of Japanese paternity.

Rephrased for stupid bone-head: it is clear as the bones and features of your head -- your daddy was Japanese -- not White.
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Lilly S. Collette

John Doe Rice did not disclose ‘why’ he was “pissed off” at me—all he did was duck his tail and run to hide.

Susan Lee Rice and her still illegitimate adult son have mocked and denigrated their victims of fraud falsely accusing them of cowardice. When their crimes are publicly exposed it is they who are shown to be the cowards.
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Lilly S. Collette

I can’t help but wonder why the deceased Mr. Rice (father of Susan Lee Rice) drank so much and abandoned Kiku and her children leaving her to work in a sewing factory and raise her children alone in a “trailer” of all places.
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Lilly S. Collette
Beware! My apparent silence is clear warning that I am up to something.
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Lilly S. Collette

Email sent to John Doe Rice
(Under the false idenity of prentiss collette)
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Free paternity test... See More
July 18 at 7:03am •
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David Bardes emailed J.D. Rice (alias prentiss) to make sure he got the message about the availabilty of free paternity testing on the Maury Povich show. This is the response that David got:

Prentiss Collette July 22 at 8:27pm Report
first of all you spelled my name wrong when it clearly explains my name on face book!!!! i know who my father is and i dont care about him or his psycho wife who was the care giver of my grandfather. i appreciate you trying to solve all of this information but i am better off knowing that my father cant hold up to his responsibilities and his wife has to step in and get involved when she has kids of her own that she denies. so further more i really would appreciate it if you would tell them to stop calling my family and stop trying to get a hold of me due to the fact that i am a better person without rick in my life.
P.s.
if i do take a dna test and he is my father things will not go well at all if you know what i mean!!!!!!!! so better off left alone because im sick and tired of all this bullshit going on 22 years later. tell rick to be a man and call me himself if he is man enough 321-230-1530 and tell lilly to back the f off before i call a lawyer and have her shut down for harassment and trust me i have a lot more money then she can think of. have a good day mr. Bardes and nothing against you just relay the message to a father that is unstable and cant take care of his own actions and responsibilities.
____________________________

Work notes on this response:

first of all you spelled my name wrong when it clearly explains my name on face book!!!!

This person is in fact John Doe Rice (Rice), the illegitimate son of Susan Lee Rice (Susan). He is not Prentiss Collette. It would take more under the laws of this state and the United States than his mother’s fraudulent application of that name to his birth certificate to legally make it his name.

i know who my father is and i don’t care about him or his psycho wife who was the care giver of my grandfather.

Rice has no proof of his paternity and his Asian features are glaring lifelong evidence that he is not the off-spring of the White man he addresses as “rick”, Richard Collette.
Rice has never pursued any form of association / contact with the obviously innocent man he alleges to be his father.
Rice has never pursued any form of association / contact with the obviously innocent man he alleges to be his grandfather, a man who fought in the Pacific during WWII.

i appreciate you trying to solve all this information but i am better off knowing that my father cant hold up to his responsibilities and his wife has to step in and get involved when she has kids off her own that she denies.

There is no information to ‘solve’. There are established facts of fraud and related crimes that need to be dealt with at trial.

So further more i really would appreciate it if you would tell them to stop calling my family and stop trying to get a hold of me due to the fact that i am a better person without rick in my life.

Phone records verify there has only been one phone call to Rupert Laurence Ali Meghnot, the stepfather of Rice on Tuesday June 13, 2010 at 12:40 PM. This call was to let Rice know that free paternity testing was available to him so that we could work for “closure” in this case. Rice did not return the call.
There was no offer or risk of “rick” entering the life of Rice.

P.s.
if i do take a dna test and he is my father things will not go well at all if you know what i mean!!!!!!!!

DNA testing can only verify the already obvious, Richard did not sire Rice.
Susan’s years of keeping Rice concealed away from Richard, his wife Lilly and significant others (sig-ot) are demonstrations that Susan feared exposure.
Rice’s years of keeping himself concealed demonstrate the same.
Rice has already demonstrated his lack of intent to submit to paternity testing through his failure to act.
Rice has already demonstrated his fear in facing Ricahard and Lilly, supported by his veiled threat that “things will not go well at all” if DNA testing shows that Richard is his father.
As DNA testing could only prove the already obvious the only persons at any risk from it are Susan, officers of the court, Rice and any sig-ot who assisted in and perpetuated this fraud.

so better off left alone because im sick and tired of all this bullshit going on 22 years later.

The “22 years later” to which Rice refers would be Susan’s sham divorce from her non-existant marriage to Richard—which Susan was clearly assisted in by officers of the court.
This is the current length of time that Susan, Rice and sig-ot’s have been successful in their crimes against Richard—and do not constitute grounds for complaint by any of them.

tell rick to be a man and call me himself if he is man enough 321-230-1530 and tell lilly to back the f off before i call a lawyer and have her shut down for harassment and trust me i have a lot more money then she can think of.

Richard is under no constitutional or moral obligation to submit himself to contact with Rice until such time as this matter is finally allowed to come to trial. Richard shall not submit to verbal allegations and attacks against his character / manhood by Rice or any of the named and yet to be named co-defendants. Richard has designated his wife Lilly to serve as his agent to insure that his rights and personal wishes are honored.
The financial history of Rice will be an issue at trial and he is of course free to seek whatever legal advice he can afford.
Lilly’s efforts to bring criminals to trial is not chargeable as ‘harassment’.

have a good day mr. Bardes and nothing against you just relay the message to a father that is unstable and cant take care of his own actions and responsibilities.
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From: David A. Bardes
Subject: Re: From Prentiss...
To: "'lillycollette'"
Date: Friday, July 23, 2010, 9:23 AM
I'm not goin on a Jerry springer show I don't care who my father is I'm better off not knowing thank you and respect my opinions and thoughts!!! It was nice talking to you

I’m not goin on a Jerry springer show I don’t care who my father is I’m better off not knowing thank you and respect my opinion and thoughts!!! It was nice talking to you.

The important thing here is his declaration: "I don't care who my father is I'm better off not knowing".
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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9668462679190108315&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000002&kqfp=10516624089901922579&kql=139&kqpfp=7636088315946720767#kq Sargeant v. Sargeant, 495 P. 2d 618 - Nev: Supreme Court 1972 (The trial court instead sought to support the $50,000 trust fund on the oral agreement to support the boy. This, of course, establishes their standing in the place of a parent (loco parentis) but one may abandon the burdens attendant upon such status at any time. Farris v. Farris, 58 Wash.2d 837, 365 P.2d 14 (1961); Franklin v. Franklin, 75 Ariz. 151, 253 P.2d 337 (1953); Chestnut v. Chestnut, 247 S.C. 332, 147 S.E.2d 269 (1966); see also 18 S.C.L.Rev. 541 (1966). Nor will bare promises of future support convert this status to a degree of permanence on the theory that the husband is estopped from withdrawing from those promises. Fuller v. Fuller, supra; cf. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App.2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 90 A.L.R.2d 569 (1961); also People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495 (1968); Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis.2d 599, 157 N.W.2d 660 (1968); Wilson v. Wilson, 14 Ohio App.2d 148, 237 N.E.2d 421, 426 (1968).)

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As a practical matter, I had to do an outline showing the events and timeline in this case where I could list the statutes and case law that may apply. I did this in preparation for filing a criminal complaint.

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TIMELINE and CASE EVENTS

1. Lilly alleges and believes that Susan had been a transient between residences when Richard temporarily allowed her to stay in his home at 7719 Nellview Drive, Charleston Heights, S.C. 29405 from mid October 1983 until early December of 1983 on the condition that she continue searching for a residence of her own.
2. Richard was in the process of completing a divorce and was not seeking a new relationship.
3. Lilly alleges and believes that Susan provided maid services in lieu of rent.
4. Richard had to force Susan to leave his home by early December 1983.
5. Susan returned sometime later in March or early April of 1984 making knowingly false accusations of Richard’s paternity of the child she was pregnant with and material misrepresentations about her time of conception.
6. Susan’s full term child was born on October 25, 1984 which would time her conception to be at the end of January 1984 -- after Richard had ejected Susan from his home. (SCDHEC birth no. 139-84-037151)
7. Susan had other options available to her but instead decided to target Richard in her scheme of fraud:
(a) Susan was twenty four (24) years of age (D/O/B/ 7-24-60);
(b) Susan was believed to have had access to health insurance through her employment (SS# 249-23-3809);
(c) Charleston County, South Carolina provides a home for unwed mothers;
(d) Susan had family residing in Charleston / Dorchester County;
(e) Susan had previously had an abortion as a consequence of an eight year relationship (1976-1984) with Claude Mackswain Attaway (SS# 249-86-1676; D/O/B/ 9-28-48) which Lilly believes and alleges would have been deemed a common law marriage under the laws of this state.
8. Susan was a trespasser in the home of Richard after previous ejectment and had regained adverse entry through coercion and knowingly fraudulent accusations of paternity.
9. In full knowledge that her fraud would be exposed upon the birth of her child, Susan attempted to coerce and force Richard into marriage.
10. Lilly alleges and believes that Susan knowingly in willful wanton violation of the laws of this state did forge or cause to be forged the misspelled name of Richard to a marriage license dated April 21, 1984, said marriage license was issued by the Probate Court of Charleston County, South Carolina.
11. The forgery of Richard’s misspelled name is brazenly obvious not matching any sample of Richard’s handwriting from any point in time before or after April 21, 1984.
12. Forgery of a marriage license is a legal impediment to any marriage contract. There was no marriage with Susan there was only a felony crime of forgery.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t16c013.htm
S.C. Code § 16-13-10 Forgery
(B) A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a: (1) felony …
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http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t20c001.htm
S.C. Code § 20-1-220
No marriage license may be issued unless a written application has been filed with the probate judge … signed by both of the contracting parties and shall contain … the social security numbers … of the contracting parties. … A probate judge or clerk of court issuing a license contrary to the provisions, upon conviction …
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S.C. Code § 20-1-510 Jurisdiction to determine validity of marriage; § 20-1-530 Declaration of invalidity
… the court may declare such contract void … for any cause going to show that, at the time the supposed contract was made, it was not a contract.
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=4080
Lukich v. Lukich, App. Ct. (2006), Op. No. 4080
Citing Callen v. Callen, 365 S.C. 618, __, 620 S.E.2d 59, 62 (2005) (holding when there is an impediment to marriage the relationship is not automatically transformed into a common-law marriage once the impediment is removed); Prevatte v. Prevatte, 297 S.C. 345, 349, 377 S.E.2d 114, 117 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding a relationship illicit at its inception does not ripen into a common-law marriage) (quoting Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 280 S.C. 546, 551, 314 S.E.2d 16, 19 (Ct. App. 1984)); Kirby v. Kirby, 270 S.C. 137, 140 , 241 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1978) (same).
The Latin phrase “ab initio” has definite and certain meaning. “Ab initio” in Latin means “from the beginning.” An agreement is said to be “void ab initio” if it has at no time had any legal validity.

13. Susan under the assumed identity of Susan R. Collette with intent to defraud and injure thereafter unlawfully filed a probate action in Charleston County on or about August 14, 1985, sixteen (16) months after her marriage license forgery of April 21, 1984, seeking Richard’s emergency commitment on her unsupported allegations of habitual drug abuse.
14. Susan produced no witnesses and Richard had no school, medical, police or conviction record supporting Susan’s allegations of habitual drug abuse.
15. Richard’s Social Security earnings history does not support Susan’s allegations of habitual drug abuse.
16. Susan interestingly also declared in her complaint that Richard only viewed her as the maid.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t16c009.htm
S.C. Code §16-9-10 Perjury and subornation of perjury
(A)(1) It is unlawful for a person to willfully give false, misleading, or incomplete testimony under oath in any court of record, judicial, administrative, or regulatory proceeding in this State. (B)(1) A person who violates the provisions of subsection (A)(1) is guilty of a felony
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S.C. Code § 16-9-30 False swearing before persons authorized to administer oaths … A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony

17. Richard was unlawfully taken into custody on Susan’s false unsupported allegations by a Charleston County sheriff’s deputy and transported in shackles to the Charleston County Memorial Hospital for an evaluation by two licensed physicians who refused to sign for his emergency commitment.
18. The record discloses that Susan was assisted in this by Lon Shull, Esq. (Shull) of the law firm of Rosen, Rosen and Hagood.
19. Lilly alleges and believes that it was Shull who then had Richard unlawfully detained and transported to the medical office of Dr. Marianne Way Rosen (wife of Richard Rosen, Esq.) after the two licensed physicians at C.C.M.H. refused to sign for his emergency commitment.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t16c003.htm
S.C. Code § 16-3-910 Kidnapping
Whoever shall unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct or carry away any other person by any means whatsoever without authority of law is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be imprisoned for a period not to exceed thirty years…
S.C. Code § 16-3-920 Conspiracy to kidnap

20. Dr. Rosen, already in the private practice of dermatology, had just graduated from MUSC in June 1985 and was not issued license number 012888 until 1986.
21. Dr. Rosen did knowingly in willful wanton violation of all pertinent statutes including S.C. Code. Title 44, Chapter 52, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commitment illegally sign for the emergency commitment of Richard on August 14, 1985.
22. Dr. Rosen’s documented reason for Richard’s emergency commitment was “he ranted and raved at his wife for hours” and he “needed a psychiatric evaluation”. Dr. Rosen also documented that Richard “was not a risk to himself or others”.
23. Richard had no wife and Susan was not present during this examination.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/CODE/t44c052.htm
S.C. Code § 44-52-10 Definitions
(1) "Chemical dependency" means a chronic disorder manifested by repeated use of alcohol or other drugs to an extent that it interferes with a person's health, social, or economic functioning; …
(2) "Chemically dependent person in need of emergency commitment" means a person who … poses a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or others if not immediately provided with emergency care and treatment.
(11) "Chemically dependent person in need of involuntary commitment" means a person who is suffering from chemical dependency as demonstrated by:
(a) recent overt acts or recent expressed acts of violence;
(b) episodes of recent serious physical problems related to the habitual and excessive use of drugs or alcohol, or both;
(c) incapacitation by drugs or alcohol, or both, on a habitual and excessive basis as evidenced by numerous appearances before the court within the preceding twelve months, repeated incidences involving law enforcement, multiple prior treatment episodes, or testimony by family or by members of the community known to the person relating to a lifestyle adversely affected by alcohol or drugs, or both.
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S.C. Code § 44-52-50 Procedure for emergency admission
Any adult person who believes that a person is chemically dependent and in need of emergency care and treatment may complete a written affidavit under oath stating:
(1) that he believes the person is suffering from chemical dependency and, as a result of his condition, poses a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or others if not immediately provided with emergency care and treatment;
(2) the specific harm thought probable, and the factual basis for this belief;
(3) that he believes the person is incapable of exercising judgment concerning emergency care.
The affidavit must be accompanied by a written certificate of a licensed physician stating that he has examined the person within forty-eight hours prior to his admission, and is of the opinion, for stated reasons, that the person is a chemically dependent person and that the immediacy of the situation and consideration of safety do not allow initiation of judicial proceedings for involuntary commitment under Section 44-52-70.

24. Lilly alleges and believes that Susan, Shull and Dr. Rosen conspired in Richard’s illegal commitment to the state mental hospital to lay a foundation for Susan’s planned sham divorce from her nonexistent marriage to Richard on the grounds of habitual drug abuse.
25. No corroborating testimony, school, medical, police or conviction records were found in the record supporting Susan’s allegations of habitual drug abuse.
26. Dr. Rosen clearly knew that Richard was being illegally, falsely and improperly confined to the state mental hospital through her own choice of words in her report and when she documented on the emergency commitment that Richard was employed with a good income and health insurance.
27. Richard was not indigent and had the means to provide for a private psychiatric evaluation by a licensed psychiatrist.

http://www.state.sc.us/dmh/history.htm
History of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health
In 1985 a U.S. Justice Department's critique of the S.C. State Hospital said conditions there were "flagrantly unconstitutional." … Joseph J. Bevilacqua, Ph.D., became the state commissioner of mental health in 1985. Under his leadership, the department supported the (1963) view that patients treated in the community do much better clinically. People with mental illnesses need and require close family and community support. They get better faster and stay better longer when they receive services in their community …
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_Mental_Health_Act
The Community Mental Health Act of 1963 (CMHA) (also known as the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act) (Public Law 88-164) was an act to provide Federal funding for community mental health centers. The purpose of the CMHA was to provide for community-based care, as an alternative to institutionalization. However, some states saw this as an excuse to close expensive state hospitals without spending some of the money on community-based care.
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http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/organization/NIMH.htm
[T]he FDA approved the use of lithium in 1970 as a treatment for manic-depressive illness (bipolar disorder), based upon NIMH research.
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Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) Discovered Schizophrenia & Manic-depression

28. Lilly is informed and believes, based on court and medical records, Richard did not receive a psychiatric evaluation at the state hospital and was improperly processed / treated for drug abuse based on Susan’s unsupported allegations.
29. Richard had a family history of Bi polar disorder which Susan had the means and opportunity to have known about prior to her marriage license forgery of April 21, 1984.
30. Richard was later diagnosed with Bi polar disorder in June of 1996.
31. Dr. Rosen, Shull and Susan unlawfully interfered with Richard’s rights to timely and appropriate psychiatric diagnosis and care.

http://www.familyaware.org/expertprofiles/drghaemi.asp
Is bipolar disorder hereditary?
Yes, bipolar disorder runs in families; it is the most genetic major psychiatric condition. It is more genetic than schizophrenia and major depression. The onset for bipolar disorder is late teens, compared to major depression, in which the onset is usually in the late 20s or early 30s. Nassir Ghaemi, M.D. Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School and Director of the Bipolar Disorder Research Program at Cambridge Hospital.

32. Dr. Rosen, Shull and Susan cannot rely on a defense that Richard was not diagnosed with Bi polar disorder until 1996 as Dr. Rosen exhibited awareness of an as yet undiagnosed psychiatric condition by her own choice of words in her report and the physical examination did not disclose any physical indication of habitual drug abuse.
33. Lilly alleges and believes that use of psychiatric evaluations in nonviolent drug abuse cases is outside of normal practice.
34. Susan thereafter had Richard unlawfully removed / ousted from his property in March 1986 by one purported to be a Charleston County sheriff’s deputy solely on Susan’s unsupported allegations that “she found drugs in his closets”.
35. No record of a police report or court order was filed or otherwise found.
36. Susan under the assumed identity of Susan R. Collette with intent to defraud did thereafter knowingly in willful wanton violation of the law fraudulently file for divorce in January 1987 on the grounds of “habitual drug abuse”.
37. Susan had not filed for Separate Maintenance and Support for her and her child covering the period from March 1986 through January 1987.
38. Shull represented Susan in this sham divorce from her nonexistent marriage to Richard.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/courtReg/displayRule.cfm?ruleID=407.0&subRuleID=RULE%203%2E1&ruleType=APP
Rule 3.1, RPC, provides that “A lawyer shall not bring…a proceeding…unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous….” The comments to this rule state, in part, that lawyers are required “to inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients’ positions.”

39. W. Robert Kinard, Esq. (Kinard) filed a ‘special appearance’ for Richard where he only raised the issue of the court’s jurisdiction and failed to file any answers to Susan’s complaint. The record further demonstrates Kinard failed to provide Richard any representation.

Rule 7, SCRFC (1982)
Where a Respondent fails to answer … may be declared in default.
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3396
Brown v. Brown, App. Ct. (2001), Op. No. 3396
fn.15. 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 181, at 284 (1980); cf. Graham v. Town of Loris, 272 S.C. 442, 248 S.E.2d 594 (1978) (holding the general rule that an attorney's neglect is attributable to the client does not apply if there has been a wilful and unilateral abandonment of client by counsel);
fn.16. "[T]he general rule that a client is bound by the acts and omissions of his attorney may not apply . . . where the conduct of counsel is outrageously in violation of . . . his implicit duty to devote reasonable efforts in representing his client." 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 181, at 285 (1980).

40. The false allegations and outrageous pleadings for relief demonstrate some of the criminal intent in this case. Susan alleged she was “married to Richard”; that the property of Richard “was acquired during her marriage to Richard” and “her name was on the title to the property”; and “she produced one child to the marriage”.
41. Susan sought permanent alimony; full medical and dental coverage for herself with Richard being responsible for the deductibles; equitable distribution of marital property; child support; full medical and dental coverage for the child of Susan with Richard being responsible for the deductibles.
42. Lilly alleges and believes that Susan would not have risked presenting her easily disproved allegations of January 1987 had she not received prior assurances that these facts would not be exposed at trial and / or she would not be subject to prosecution for perjury.
43. Lilly alleges and believes, supported by the language used in the divorce decree, that Shull, Kinard and the judge, Bernard J. Warshauer (Warshauer) entered into a conspiracy to defraud Richard out of a hearing on the merits in an improper private conference with Warshauer immediately before the final hearing or perhaps even earlier.
44. Shull falsely alleged in this conference that Richard and Susan had reached an agreement on all issues except the divorce and Shull’s pre-trial brief filed right before the hearing documents that no agreement had been reached.
45. Richard and Susan were never married and there is no basis in law for any divorce and divorce agreement between them.
46. Shull had prior knowledge of Richard’s questionable mental status (August 14, 1985).
47. Shull did not raise any of Susan’s false allegations to the court for a ruling he exclusively raised the falsely alleged agreement.
48. Warshauer and Kinard allowed Shull to improperly proceed unchallenged.
49. The divorce decree written by Shull and signed by Warshauer plainly states, “Based upon the representations of counsel, the testimony presented in Court and the entire case record of this matter I make the following findings of fact”.
50. The only thing in the record (case file no. 87-DR-10-0294) was Susan’s false allegations to which Kinard had filed no answers in full knowledge that failure to file answers would result in Richard’s exclusion from participation at trial.
51. Warshauer had a duty to know and therefore did know that Susan’s affidavits in the case record were not admissible without laying a proper foundation through her testimony.
52. Warshauer improperly accepted Susan’s affidavits without the required supporting testimony and then allowed Susan to amend her petition to one year’s separation further preventing Richard from answering.

From the divorce decree:
Prior the hearing the attorneys advised the Court that an Agreement had been reached between the parties settling all issues except that of the divorce. … Subsequent to the presentation of the Agreement the Petitioner moved to amend her Petition to request a divorce on the statutory grounds of one year’s separation, a vinculo matrimonii.

53. The only testimony documented on the divorce decree was Susan’s sister saying that Susan had been separated from Richard for over a year.

Line 8 of the decree:
That the Petitioner presented the corroborating testimony of Ms. Flynn, the Petitioner’s sister, and that the Court finds that no collusion was entered into by the parties and that the parties have indeed been living separate and apart on a continuous basis in excess of one year.

54. Susan was never married to Richard and the only separation which occurred was when Susan had Richard illegally separated / ousted from his property in March 1986.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinionPF.cfm?caseNo=26092
Morris v. Monceaux, Sup. Ct. (2006) Op. No. 26092
… The Legislature repeatedly used the term “hearing” throughout the statute, indicating a proceeding at which parties are allowed to present evidence and sworn testimony bearing on issues before the family court. … It is well established that counsel’s statements regarding the facts of a case and counsel’s arguments are not admissible evidence. E.g. McManus v. Bank of Greenwood, 171 S.C. 84, 89, 171 S.E. 473, 475 (1933) (appellate courts repeatedly have held “that statements of fact appearing only in arguments of counsel will not be considered”); S.C. Dept. of Transp. v. Thompson, 357 S.C. 101, 105, 590 S.E.2d 511, 513 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[a]rguments made by counsel are not evidence”). Consequently, the family court may not base necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law solely on counsel’s statements of fact or arguments. In addition, written affidavits and reports generally constitute inadmissible hearsay, with some exceptions, although they may become admissible in whole or part when a proper foundation is laid by a witness’s testimony. See Rules 801-804, SCRE; Rule 7, SCRFC.
[1] None of the attorneys moved to submit any written documents into evidence during their descriptions of the case …
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S.C. Code § 20-7-420 Jurisdiction of family court in domestic matters
Repeatedly used the term “to hear and determine” throughout the statute, “indicating a proceeding at which parties are allowed to present evidence and sworn testimony bearing on issues before the family court”.
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S.C. Code §20-3-20 Collusion
The act complained of was done with the knowledge or assent of the Plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining a divorce the court shall not grant such divorce.

55. The divorce decree plainly states, “That the parties have reached an Agreement the substance of which is as follows”. The decree of divorce is the only written rendition of the falsely alleged agreement.
56. Charleston County deputy clerk of court Ron Reuger informed Lilly during her search for a copy of the alleged agreement that, “The decree of divorce is the agreement”.
57. No written agreement has in fact ever been presented to or signed by Richard.
58. There is no consent order or any court forms bearing the signature of Richard.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t32c003.htm
S.C. Code § 32-3-10
Agreements required to be in writing and signed.
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http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t20c007.htm
S.C. Code §20-7-955
… settlements and voluntary agreements … reduced to writing, signed by the parties, and properly verified … accompanied by financial declarations and affidavits … that they have voluntarily executed the agreement … which must be filed with the summons and complaint. A defendant's affidavit must state that the defendant is capable of fulfilling any financial requirements of the agreement or consent order applicable to the defendant. Upon the court's approval, the settlement or voluntary agreement becomes an order of the court.

59. The decree of divorce documents this ‘court of record’ failed to have the required court reporter present at this hearing.
60. Lilly alleges and believes this may have been a precautionary move on the part of Shull and Warshauer to prevent Richard from having a record of what actually transpired in case he had somehow regained his right mind.
61. The defendants cannot rely on the defense that there is no record of what transpired where they unlawfully prevented the making of a required record.
62. The decree of divorce and all of the case files present sufficient evidence to support Lilly’s complaint.

Rule 28, SCRFC (1984)
The Court, as a court of record, shall grant no divorce unless testimony … is recorded …
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/courtReg/displayRule.cfm?ruleID=43.0&subRuleID=&ruleType=CIV
RULE 43(k), SCRCP, Agreements of Counsel
No agreement between counsel affecting the proceedings in an action shall be binding unless reduced to the form of a consent order or written stipulation signed by counsel and entered in the record, or unless made in open court and noted upon the record.
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=26105
State v. Means, Sup. Ct. (2006), Op. No. 26105.
In South Carolina, an indictment “shall be deemed and judged sufficient and good in law which, in addition to allegations as to time and place, as required by law, charges the crime substantially in the language of the common law or of the statute prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood and, if the offense be a statutory offense, that the offense be alleged to be contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.” . . .

63. Lilly alleges and believes that the agreement falsely alleged by Shull and obviously supported by Kinard and Warshauer was for the obvious felonious purpose of aiding and abetting Susan in her crimes.

S.C. Code § 16-1-40. Accessory
A person who aids in the commission of a felony or is an accessory before the fact in the commission of a felony by counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring the felony to be committed is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be punished in the manner prescribed for the punishment of the principal felon.

64. The divorce decree and the record establish that Warshauer never held a hearing on the merits, never established and never adjudicated anything in this case.
65. This constitutes a complete abject failure to exercise any form of judicial discretion which can only be reasonably explained through Warshauer being a party to these frauds.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25434
Faile v. SCDJJ, Sup. Ct. (2002), Op. No. 25434
Discretionary immunity is an affirmative defense requiring … to prove … evaluated competing alternatives and made a "judgment" call based on applicable professional standards. Foster v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 306 S.C. 519, 413 S.E.2d 31 (1992). Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 304 S.C. 195, 403 S.E.2d 615 (1991) The duty is discretionary if the governmental entity proves it actually weighed competing considerations, faced with alternatives, and made a conscious decision based upon those considerations. Id. (citing Niver v. Dep't Highways & Pub. Transp., 302 S.C. 461, 395 S.E.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1990)).

66. Lilly alleges and believes that Warshauer improperly failed to review evidence and took no testimony regarding the alleged marriage, he exclusively relied on Susan’s pleadings and Shull’s word that there was a marriage.
67. Marriage is a primary issue critical to the court establishing jurisdiction in a divorce. Susan’s forged marriage license does not create a marriage it only verifies a felony.
68. There was no marriage therefore the court was completely without jurisdiction.
69. The court was without personal jurisdiction over the person of Richard.
70. Lilly alleges and believes that Shull was aware of impediments in the alleged marriage by failing to give the required date for the alleged marriage.

Line 1 of the decree:
That the parties last lived together as husband and wife in the County of Charleston, State of South Carolina in March of 1986 and that this Court has jurisdiction over all these matters.
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“The marital estate must be identified as of a fixed date.” Panhorst v. Panhorst, 301 S.C. 100, 105, 390 S.E.2d 376, 379 (Ct. App. 1990).
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http://www.constitution.org/bouv/bouvier_c.htm
Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1856 Edition
CONCUBINE. A woman who cohabits with a man as his wife without being married.

71. Lilly alleges and believes that Warshauer failed to review any evidence and took no testimony regarding the alleged marital property, he exclusively relied on Susan’s pleadings and on Shull’s word that there was marital property which Richard was allegedly willing to sign over to Susan for no stated / declared purpose.

Line 2 of the decree:
That the parties have reached an Agreement the substance of which is as follows:
(a)That the Respondent will transfer all his interest and ownership in the marital home to the Petitioner as of the date of this Order. The September mortgage payment shall be pro-rated between the parties. As the date of the hearing was the 10th of September, the Petitioner shall be responsible for two-thirds (2/3) of the mortgage payment and the Respondent shall be responsible for one-third (1/3) of the mortgage payment of September. That the Petitioner shall assume all responsibility for the Veteran’s Administration mortgage loan and that the Respondent does hereby warrant to the Court and to the Petitioner that there are no other encumbrances on the marital home.

72. Failure to declare the cause / purpose for this alleged agreement to transfer property creates the appearance of collusion and it more importantly raises the legal question, “Would any man in his right mind ever voluntarily agree to sign over his property to a woman under circumstances similar to this case”?
73. Shull had a duty to verify the property which Susan alleged was “acquired during her marriage to Richard” and “had her name on the title”.
74. No address, location or description of this property is given on the divorce decree which is purported to be “the Agreement”.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t20c005.htm
S.C. Code § 20-5-50 Requisites of marriage contracts, deeds and settlements
All marriage contracts, deeds and settlements shall therein describe, specify and particularize the real and personal estate thereby intended to be included, comprehended, conveyed and passed or shall have a schedule thereto annexed containing a description and the particulars and articles of the real and personal estate intended to be conveyed and passed by such marriage contracts, deeds and settlements. Any such schedule shall be annexed to the contract, deed or other settlement paper, signed, executed and delivered by the parties therein interested at the time of the signing, executing and delivering the marriage contract, deed or settlement, be subscribed by the same witness who subscribed the marriage contract, deed or settlement and be recorded therewith; otherwise, and in default of such schedule and recording thereof as aforesaid, the marriage contract, deed or settlement shall be deemed and declared to be fraudulent, null and void with respect to and against creditors and bona fide purchasers or mortgagees.

75. Shull’s reference to the Veteran’s Administration mortgage loan evidences some awareness of the ownership status of Richard’s property.
76. The Veteran’s mortgage loan and the property title show the property was acquired by Richard and Deborah L. Collette in July 1979 five (5) years prior to Susan’s marriage license forgery of April 21, 1984 and Susan’s name was not on any of these documents.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t20c007.htm
S.C. Code § 20-7-473 Marital and nonmarital property; nonmarital property as not subject to judicial apportionment
The term "marital property" as used in this article means all real and personal property which has been acquired by the parties during the marriage … except the following, which constitute nonmarital property: … (2) property acquired by either party before the marriage and property acquired after … (b) formal signing of a written property or marital settlement agreement; …The court does not have jurisdiction or authority to apportion nonmarital property.

77. The court was without jurisdiction over the property of Richard.
78. Richard did not sign his property over to Susan demonstrating that he was not in agreement or in the alternative he may not have understood or even known about the alleged agreement.
79. Lilly alleges and believes that Warshauer failed to review any evidence and took no testimony regarding a child allegedly “born to the marriage”, he just went on Shull’s word and Susan’s pleadings that there was such a child, which Richard was allegedly willing to provide Susan support and continued health insurance for.

Line 2 of the decree:
That the parties have reached an Agreement the substance of which is as follows:
(b) That the Respondent shall pay unto the Petitioner Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars per month as child support. Said amount to be paid directly to the Petitioner.
(c) That the Respondent shall continue to carry health and major medical insurance on the minor child and that the parties shall divide equally all medical expenses not covered by insurance.
(h) That the Respondent shall have reasonable and liberal visitation including every other weekend from 6:00 PM on Friday to 6:00 PM on Sunday; alternating the major holidays of Christmas, New Years, Easter, July 4th and Thanksgiving; allowing the Respondent extended visitation in the summer as arranged by the parties and for such other times as the parties may mutually agree.
Line 4. That at the time of this hearing the Respondent’s net income was zero (0) and his expenses were One Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Seven ($1,197.00) Dollars per month.

80. The sham decree of divorce written by Shull plainly shows that Richard has not been adjudicated to be the legal father of any named identifiable child and no named identifiable child is declared to be a child of a marriage or entitled to the support of Richard.
81. There is no identifiable designation of whom or what Richard was to have visitation with.
82. There is no determination on the divorce decree or in the record of who was granted custody of this mystery child.
83. Richard has never signed an acknowledgment of his paternity of any child.
84. Susan’s full-term child was conceived at the end of January 1984 and born on October 25, 1984 and Susan was three (3) months pregnant on April 21, 1984 when the marriage license with Richard was forged.
85. Susan’s child could not be born to a marriage which never existed.
86. Both Richard and Susan are White persons and the child of Susan is fully Asian in appearance bearing no resemblance to Richard in any way. Richard’s paternity of the fully Asian featured child shown here is an absolute physical impossibility.

http://www.state.sc.us/dss/csed/patest.htm
Establishing paternity means that either a court or administrative order is issued stating who the legal father is. By establishing paternity, the father is providing the child with certain rights and privileges: financial support, Social Security benefits, and Inheritance protections.

87. The unlawful fraudulently alleged agreement to pay child support for an unnamed unidentified child without establishing and adjudicating paternity fails to establish jurisdiction over the person of the child.
88. Lilly alleges and believes that it was known that jurisdiction over the child could not be established without a hearing and a hearing could only prove Richard was not the father and that was one of the intents behind the falsely alleged agreement.
89. Even if a valid marriage had occurred between Richard and Susan it would not have legitimated Susan’s child under the laws of S.C. as Richard is obviously not a biological or adoptive father of this child.
90. Susan’s illegitimate child would have only been a foster child to Richard and only for so long as a marriage may have lasted with Richard owing no legal duties to the child after a divorce.

S.C. Code § 62-1-201
(3) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under this Code by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any person who is only a stepchild, foster child …”
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See, … and Chestnut v. Chestnut, 147 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 1966) In declaring that these men could avoid a support obligation, both courts directly quoted the following statement from the Iowa Supreme Court as representing the accepted common law: One important qualification is that one merely standing in the place of a parent may abandon the burdens attendant upon such status at any time. In McDonald v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association it is said: “. . . the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child.” … Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (1983) (obligation to support stepchildren under statute depends on existence of valid marriage and ceases on entry of divorce); Tanielian v. Brooks, 202 Mich. App. 304, 508 N.W.2d 189 (1993) (no duty to support stepchild after divorce); Quintela v. Quintela, 4 Neb. App. 396, 544 N.W.2d 111 (1996) (divorce terminates the in loco parentis relationship); Duffey v. Duffey, 113 N.C. App. 382, 438 S.E.2d 445 (1994) (there is no duty of stepparent to support stepchild after divorce)

91. There is no law in S.C. or anywhere else which would impose any obligation on Richard for the support of Susan’s illegitimate child.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t20c007.htm
S.C. Code § 20-7-30 Definitions.
(5) "Parent" means biological parent, adoptive parents, step-parent, or person with legal custody.

Richard meets none of the criteria above.
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SC Code. § 20-7-952. … person entitled to initiate paternity action.
C. An action to establish the paternity of an individual may be brought by:
(1) A child;
(2) The natural mother of a child;
(5) A person who claims to be the father of a child.

Constitutional issue: Men falsely accused of paternity are denied / not granted statutory right to initiate a paternity action to clear their name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------S.C. Code § 20-7-953 Jurisdiction; …
A. Any person who has sexual intercourse in this State thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to an action brought under this subarticle with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse.
B. Unless the court orders otherwise, the custody of an illegitimate child is solely in the natural mother unless the mother has relinquished her rights to the child. If paternity has been acknowledged or adjudicated, the father may petition the court for rights of visitation or custody in a proceeding before the court apart from an action to establish paternity. (Men falsely accused of paternity are denied / not granted statutory right to initiate a paternity action to clear their name.)
D. Any proceeding commenced under this subarticle is a civil action. The natural mother of the child and the alleged father are competent to testify and may be compelled by the court to appear and give testimony. (The Lord Mansfield Rule does not apply in South Carolina.)

Jurisdiction rests solely on the possibility of conception. There is no physical possibility of Richard siring a fully Asian featured child. RICHARD HAS NEVER SIRED ANY CHILD, HAS NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED PATERNITY OF ANY CHILD AND HAS NEVER BEEN ADJUDICATED TO BE THE LEGAL FATHER OF ANY CHILD.
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S.C. Code §20-7-956 Admissibility of evidence at hearing
(A) The following evidence is admissible at a hearing to determine paternity:
(6) A birth certificate containing the signature of the mother and the putative father. This evidence creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity. (See, Pinckney v. Warren)
(9) (B) Upon the motion of any party to the action or upon its own motion, the court may view a child for the purpose of examining the presence or the absence of physical characteristics and similarities between the child and the putative father. )

There never was any hearing or rights of rebuttal extended to Richard because of the falsely alleged agreement.
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http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t44c063.htm
SECTION 44-63-161. Unlawful acts; penalties.
(A) It is unlawful for a person: … (2) to wilfully make a false statement in a certificate, … or to wilfully supply false information … (4) to wilfully obtain, possess, use, furnish to another, … for the purpose of deception, a certificate, … (B) A person who violates a provision of item (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (A) is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

SC Code. § 44-63-165. Birth certificate of illegitimate child to be prepared when father acknowledges paternity. A certificate must be prepared for a child born out of wedlock in this State to include the name of the father upon receipt of a sworn acknowledgment of paternity signed by both parents to include the surname by which the child is to be known.

Richard was never married to Susan and obviously not the parent of her illegitimate child. Susan had no authority under the laws of this state -- or through Richard -- to use Richard’s surname for her illegitimate child.
Susan unlawfully applied the unauthorized alias of “Richard Prentiss Collette” to her illegitimate child with intent to defraud therein denying her child all right legal / supposed to the use of the name (fraud being a legal bar to the use of a name). Susan’s illegitimate child was denied a lawful name due to Susan’s refusal to pursue adjudication of paternity and the extrinsic fraud of Susan and officers of the court. The illegitimate child of Susan Lee Rice is and remains by law JOHN DOE RICE.

See, Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. 1968) (requisite prejudice had not been shown where it was alleged that allowing the former husband to deny paternity would illegitimize the child; court observed that because the child's natural father had neither married the child's mother nor acknowledged paternity, the child was and always had been illegitimate).
Also see, McMillian by McMillian v. Heckler, 759 F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir. 1985) [I]t is clear that Congress intended that a claimant invoking either of the alternative means of establishing entitlement provided by § 416(h)(3)(C) should be put to proving as one ultimate fact that the insured was his natural parent.

Neither Susan nor her now adult child has pursued adjudication of paternity.
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http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t62c002.htm
SC CODE § 62-2-109 Meaning of child and related terms
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine succession by, through, or from a person:
(2) In cases not covered by (1), a person born out of wedlock is a child of the mother. That person is also a child of the father if:
(i) the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child …
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25271
Pinckney v. Warren, S.C. Sup Ct. (2001) Op. No. 25271
Public policy demands the strict adherence to the Mitchell requirements. Fraudulent assertions of paternity will be much less likely to succeed, or even to arise, where proof of paternity must be established by either a court order issued prior to the father's death or by an instrument signed by the father. See Lalli v.Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S. Ct. 518, 58 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1978) (holding public policy supports a rule where paternity must be established by an order of filiation issued during the putative father's lifetime for an illegitimate child to recover as an heir at law). In Freeman, the child could not meet the strict requirements of Mitchell, but she could produce a birth certificate with her biological father’s name on it. Id. at 103, 473 S.E. 2d at 472. However, Freeman demonstrates a birth certificate cannot be used in lieu of the specific documents required by Mitchell.

JOHN DOE RICE traveling under the fraudulent alias of RICHARD PRENTISS COLLETTE does not even have a valid birth certificate under the laws of this state.
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http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLfiles/SC/26024.htm
Neely v. Thomasson, Sup. Ct. (2005)
Because the court found that one child was born during the marriage, and that Decedent was the parent of that child, we find that the issue of paternity was adjudicated in the divorce proceeding. … Moreover, Decedent and Mother had resolved custody and support issues in the separation agreement signed years ago. Therefore, we hold that the divorce proceedings constituted a prior adjudication of paternity.
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Opinion on web
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Keri Lynne Jones v. Cheryl Pike Barlow,
No. 034907803
(February 16, 2007)
… Taylor v. Taylor, 364 P.2d 444 (Wash. 1961), and Chestnut v. Chestnut, 147 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 1966) In declaring that these men could avoid a support obligation, both courts directly quoted the following statement from the Iowa Supreme Court as representing the accepted common law: One important qualification is that one merely standing in the place of a parent may abandon the burdens attendant upon such status at any time. In McDonald v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association it is said: “. . . the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child.” …

Richard is obviously not the biological or adoptive father of Susan's child and did NOT stand in loco parentis to the seventeen (17) month old child of Susan after March 1986 when Susan had Richard illegally removed / ousted from his property.
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Uniform Parentage Act (2000). § 607. COMMENT: citing to the Uniform Parentage Act (1973) § 6. “It is inappropriate to assume a presumption known by all those concerned to be untrue.”
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Uniform Probate Code § 2-114(c). “On the other hand, if the family is not intact and the presumed father neither cohabited with the mother at the time of conception nor treated the child as his own, as a practical matter the issue of NON-paternity of the presumed father is generally assumed by all the parties concerned under those facts.”)

92. Warshauer failed to issue a lawful final order in this case.
93. Warshauer did knowingly in willful wanton violation of all established law illegally issue a sham order to fraudulently coerce Richard into compliance with an alleged agreement which did not exist in law or in fact.
94. The sham decree of divorce, purported to be the agreement, on its face is a clear and blatant violation of the 14th Amendment: “…nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=26041
Callen v. Callen, Sup. Ct. (2005) Op. No. 26041
… [O]ur review in this case is limited to a determination of whether there is any evidence to support the trial judge’s findings. The question is not what conclusion this Court would have reached after reviewing the facts, but whether the facts as found by the family court are supported by the evidence. … “When the trial judge is vested with discretion, but his ruling reveals no discretion was, in fact, exercised, an error of law has occurred.” Fontaine v. Peitz, 291 S.C. 536, 538, 354 S.E.2d 565, 566 (1987); see also In re Robert M., 294 S.C. 69, 70-71, 362 S.E.2d 639, 640-41 (1987); State v. Smith, 276 S.C. 494, 498, 280 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1981).
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http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=4th&navby=case&no=011442P
Hensley v. Alcon Labartories, Inc., App. Ct. 4th Cir. (2002) Op. No. 01-1442
Because exercise of the authority to enforce settlement agreements depends on the parties' agreement to a complete settlement, the court cannot enforce a settlement until it concludes that a complete agreement has been reached and determines the terms and conditions of that agreement. See Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir.
1983). "[I]t is improper for the district court, by its own motion or by agreement of the parties, to place itself in the role of `final arbiter' of a settlement agreement." Id.
While the court did announce that it would conduct a hearing that "hearing" consisted only of an off-the-record conference ... As reported by the court, Hensley's objections to the settlement agreement were discussed at the conference and given "careful consideration." Nonetheless the court did not take any evidence, nor did it make any factual findings.
[W]e reverse and remand this case to the district court and to a different district judge to conduct a plenary hearing on whether a complete settlement agreement was reached and if so, to determine its terms and conditions. If the court is unable, following such a hearing, to enforce a settlement agreement, it shall afford Hensley the opportunity to proceed with his case on the merits.
*Absent express agreement between an attorney and client, the attorney's implied authority is limited to negotiating a settlement, not agreeing to it. See Auvil v. Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226, 229-30 (4th Cir. 1996).
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=4226
Patricia Grand Hotel v. MacGuire Enterprises, App. Ct. (2007)
“South Carolina common law requires that, in order to have a valid and enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between the parties with regard to all essential and material terms of the agreement.” … Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1983). … The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the matter. The court noted that although the district court had the power to enforce complete settlement agreements, “it does not have the power to impose, in the role of arbiter, a settlement agreement where there was never a meeting of the parties’ minds.” Ozyagcilar, 701 F.2d at 308. The court noted that “[w]here there has been no meeting of the minds sufficient to form a complete settlement agreement, any partial performance of the settlement agreement must be rescinded and the case restored to the docket for trial.” Id.

95. Warshauer’s certification of compliance with Rule 27, SCRFC (subsequently renumbered as Rule 26) cannot convert these frauds into a lawful court order it only certifies the lack of credibility and integrity of the defendants in this action.
96. Warshauer’s order was Void ab initio.

Condon v. Condon, 280 S.C. 357, 312 S.E. 2d 588 (Ct. App. 1984)
Warshauer was reversed for violating Rule 27(c) SCRFC.
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http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&case=/data2/circs/7th/001429.html
United States v. County of Cook, 167 F.3d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing that the exception from res judicata for collateral attacks challenging jurisdiction is necessary "because otherwise a court that lacked jurisdiction could strong-arm a party to litigate the subject, decide in favor of its own power, and thus block any review of its adjudicatory competence.")
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“Only an inspection of the record of the case showing that the judge was without jurisdiction or violated a person’s due process rights, or where fraud was involved in the attempted procurement of jurisdiction, is sufficient for an order to be void.” Potenz Corp. v. Petrozzini, 170 Ill. App. 3d 617, 525 N.E. 2d 173, 175 (1988).
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http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t16c017.htm
S.C. Code § 16-17-410 Conspiracy
The common law crime known as "conspiracy" is defined as a combination between two or more persons for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful object or lawful object by unlawful means. A person who commits the crime of conspiracy is guilty of a felony
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S.C. Code § 16-17-10 Barratry prohibited
Any person who shall:
(2) Wilfully bring, prosecute or maintain an action, at law or in equity, in any court having jurisdiction within this State and (a) has no direct or substantial interest in the relief thereby sought, (b) thereby seeks to defraud or mislead the court, (c) brings such action with intent to distress or harass any party thereto or (d) directly or indirectly receives any money or other thing of value to induce the bringing of such action; Shall be guilty of the crime of barratry. The crime of barratry shall be punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or by imprisonment of not more than two years, or both…

97. Failing to establish and adjudicate the paternity of Susan’s illegitimate child and issue a lawful order of child support deprived the child of a lawful name and any legally enforceable rights to future benefits -- all Susan had was a worthless and non-existent agreement to provide two hundred ($200.00) dollars per month for an unidentified / unnamed person.
98. Susan filed no motions with the court addressing any of the failures caused by Shull’s machinations.
99. Lilly alleges and believes that Susan’s failure to file any motions constitutes probable cause to believe that Susan was an active participant in the creation of the illegal order of Warshauer.
100. Susan and Shull sought no enforcement of this alleged agreement until twenty seven (27) months later at a RTSC on November 6, 1989 heard by the judge Larry R. Patterson (Patterson).
101. Lilly alleges and believes, based on procedure, that Shull presented the decree of divorce and the title to Richard’s property in court to establish the alleged agreement and coerce Richard into signing title over to Susan.
102. David Crawford, Esq. (Crawford) appeared for Richard at this RTSC and provided no representation.
103. Crawford filed a knowing perjury that Richard was “ready, willing and able to sign over his interest in the marital property to Susan”.
104. Crawford in fact had verifiable prior knowledge that Richard’s property was not marital and was beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

In re Meeder, 327 S.C. 169, 488 S.E.2d 875 (1997) (… failure to provide competent representation, act with reasonable diligence in representing client, and explain matter to extent reasonably necessary to permit client to make informed decisions …).
Rule 1.2, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, failing to consult with a client and failing to abide by a client's wishes;
Rule 1.15, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, failing to safe-keep a client's property; …

105. The facially defective divorce decree purported to be “the Agreement” and the property title presented clear warning on its face of fraud in this case sufficient to provoke honest persons into closer examination of the file and Warshauer’s order.
106. Susan’s pleadings for relief (January 87) were for “equitable distribution of marital property”.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/courtReg/displayRule.cfm?ruleID=2.0&subRuleID=&ruleType=FAM
RULE 2(a), SCRFC, Domestic Relations Actions
... The following SCRCP, however, shall be inapplicable: 5(a) to the extent it does not require notice to a defendant of every hearing, 8(d) to the extent it provides that the failure to file a responsive pleading constitutes an admission, … 54(c) to the extent it permits the court to grant relief not requested in the pleadings, …

107. Patterson unlawfully ordered Richard to sign over his property to Susan therein granting her full title under duress of indefinite imprisonment on contempt until he did sign.

S.C. Code § 16-13-240 Obtaining signature or property by false pretenses
A person who by false pretense or representation obtains the signature of a person to a written instrument or obtains from another person any chattel, money, valuable security, or other property, real or personal, with intent to cheat and defraud a person of that property is guilty of a: (1) felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than five hundred dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years if the value of the property is five thousand dollars or more;

108. Patterson unlawfully ordered Richard to pay two hundred ($200.00) dollars per month through the court as child support.
109. Patterson unlawfully ordered Richard to pay an additional eighty ($80.00) dollars per month through the court for Susan to purchase health insurance for her child through her employment as Susan had moved to Florida and it would be impractical for Richard to purchase the insurance policy in South Carolina.
110. Patterson unlawfully ordered Richard to pay the court a three (3%) per cent fee on the above amounts collected and therein generated a profit for the court in Susan’s scheme of fraud.
111. The order of Patterson was Void ab initio.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinionPF.cfm?caseNo=26120
Farnsworth v. Davis, S.C. Sup. Ct. (2006)
(Patterson) REVERSED
The circuit court, therefore, ordered Farnsworth to comply with an agreement that did not exist. …
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/displayOpinionPF.cfm?caseNo=26186
Buckley v. Shealy, S.C. Sup. Ct. (2006)
In the present case, the parties did not enter an agreement on the record before the court. … The Ashfort opinion directly addresses the type of scenario presented in the case at bar. … Accordingly, we uphold the family court’s decision not to enforce the agreement. … Second, the family court exercised its power in equity to ensure a just result. See Ex Parte Dibble, 279 S.C 592, 595-96, 310 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ct. App. 1983) (stating the time honored equitable maxim that all courts have the inherent power to all things reasonable necessary to ensure that just results are reached to the fullest extent possible).

112. The November 6, 1989 RTSC was for enforcement of the alleged agreement in the divorce decree located in case file no. 87-DR-10-0294.
113. Patterson did not sign his order on this RTSC until April 1, 1990. See, Rule 26, SCRFC.
114. Patterson’s order was improperly placed under a new case file no. 90-DR-10-02881 and was not cross-indexed back to 87-DR-10-0294 as required.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/trial/clerks/manual/index.cfm
Practice and Procedure.
7.3.2 Assigning Case Numbers
Actions which request only that an existing order be enforced, without changing the terms of the existing order and without raising a new matter, are not considered new actions. All papers and Rules to Show Cause pertaining to enforcement actions should be filed in the case file with the existing order. …
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/courtReg/displayRule.cfm?ruleID=6.0&subRuleID=&ruleType=FAM
SCRFC, Rule 6(a)(1). The clerk of court for each county shall keep a File Book, relating to domestic relations actions in the family court, in which there shall be entered and cross-indexed all proceedings of a domestic relations nature which are instituted in the family court for the county.
(g) Failure to comply with the requirements of this rule shall subject the person so failing to penalties as for contempt of court; which contempt shall be enforced by the court on motion of any aggrieved party or by the court on its own motion.

115. Lilly alleges and believes that the improper switching of the case file numbers without the required cross-indexing was a deliberate act to allow Susan to proceed with future hearings under Patterson’s order, case file no. 90-DR-10-02881, while avoiding exposure of the errors in Warshauer’s order, case file no. 87-DR-19-0294. This is viewed as a deliberate act of concealment and obstruction of justice.
116. There were a large number of subsequent RTSC hearings over the years all of which were conducted under Patterson’s order in case file no. 90-DR-10-02881.
117. The two hundred eighty ($280.00) dollars per month that Patterson improperly ordered Richard to pay through the court was increased to three hundred thirty nine ($339.76) and 76/100 dollars per month within the year on Susan’s allegations of an increase in her child’s health insurance premiums therein establishing Susan’s knowledge that she was under order to purchase the policy of health insurance.
118. Later medical record billings (submitted to the court June 13, 2001) show that while Richard had been forced to pay for health insurance from 1990 forward, Susan had not purchased that insurance until May 5, 1995.
119. Susan was using a willing court to extort these monthly funds from Richard and then she was defrauding her child out of the benefits she was allegedly seeking for him and to which she knew he was never entitled.
120. Susan sold the property of Richard in December of 1991 for fifty seven thousand nine hundred ($57,900.00) dollars and is believed to have netted approximately twenty seven thousand four hundred ($27,400.00) dollars in profit.
121. Richard did not receive any of the funds from the sale of his property.
122. Lilly alleges and believes, based on property records, that Susan used those funds as a down payment on a home at 640 Birgham Place, Lake Mary, Florida 32746 titled exclusively under the alias of Susan R. Collette.
123. In 1999 Lilly asked Richard for the 1987 divorce decree for her review only to discover that Richard, nor any member of his family, had received any of the court documents from this case and were unable to explain any case details.
124. Lilly requested a copy of the divorce decree from the family court and after protracted stalling the court finally provided Richard a copy of the 1987 divorce decree on April 7, 2000 -- thirteen (13) years after the divorce.
125. It was immediately obvious on the face of the divorce decree that paternity had not been established or adjudicated raising serious questions about the validity of the order.
126. No reasonable person could be expected to believe that this court had somehow inadvertently failed over many years and numerous RTSC hearings to see that no determination of paternity and custody had ever occurred. See, Eichman v. Eichman, 285 S.C. 378, 329 S.E.2d 764 (1985).

http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess114_2001-2002/hj01/20010508.htm
114th Session, 2001-2002, Journal of the House of Representatives, Tuesday, May 8, 2001, Judicial Merit Selection Commission, Report of Candidate Qualifications.
L. Mendel Rivers, Jr.: … (1978-1993- … resident judge, Charleston County.) … As important as Family Court is, the judge is unfortunately required to apply very familiar law to constantly recurring, similar facts. At some point, the intellectually curious become bored. Judge Rivers described five of his most significant orders or opinions as follows: (c) Eichman v. Eichman, 285 S.C. 378, 329 S.E.2d 764 (1985).
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/HTMLfiles/SC/26024.htm
Neely v. Thomasson, Sup. Ct. (2005) Op. No. 26024
A person born out of wedlock may inherit from a father who dies intestate if it is determined, “in an adjudication commenced before the death of the father,” that the person is the father’s child. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-109(2) (1986). … Because the court found that one child was born during the marriage, and that Decedent was the parent of that child, we find that the issue of paternity was adjudicated in the divorce proceeding. … Moreover, Decedent and Mother had resolved custody and support issues in the separation agreement signed years ago. Therefore, we hold that the divorce proceedings constituted a prior adjudication of paternity. Citing, Eichman, 285 S.C. at 380, 329 S.E.2d at 766 (1985)
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=4246
Duckett v. Goforth, App. Ct. (May 15, 2007) Op. No. 4246
In South Carolina, a paternity determination for the purposes of child support relates to the natural or biological relationship between father and child. See S.C. Code Ann §§ 20-7-952 through 958 (Supp. 2006). While a child born during a marriage is the presumed legitimate child of the husband, that presumption may be rebutted by a paternity determination. Douglass ex rel. Louthian v. Boyce, 344 S.C. 5, 8, 542 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (2001) (interpreting S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-952 (E) (1985)). Treating a child as a child of the family during the marriage does not rise to the level of a paternity determination in South Carolina. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the family court to address the question of … paternity in order to assure … is supported in a manner consistent with South Carolina’s legislative mandate. … the issue of paternity was never fully and finally litigated.

127. Richard had not worked since October 2000 because of health issues and was having to file for Social Security disability insurance (SSDI).
128. Richard was under threat of being illegally jailed again for failure to pay child support under the unlawful order of Patterson / Warshauer.
129. Lilly believed that Susan would fraudulently place her illegitimate child on auxiliary benefits under Richard’s award of SSDI and possibly be receiving benefits for herself if this matter was not addressed.
130. Richard had been previously represented at least three (3) licensed attorneys in this case each engaging in legal malpractice to varying degree.
131. In December 2000, after months of being turned down by every attorney consulted, Lilly was forced to file a 60(b)(4) motion on behalf of Richard with the intent of getting this outrageous criminal fraud vacated.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t20c007.htm
S.C. Code § 20-7-420 Jurisdiction of family court in domestic matters
(A) The family court has exclusive jurisdiction:
(25) To modify or vacate any order issued by the court.
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25091
Hagy v. Pruitt, Sup. Ct. (March 20, 2000), Op. No. 25091
(… court has the inherent authority to set aside a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud in spite of any facially applicable statute of limitations).
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25627
Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., Sup. Ct. (2003), Op. No. 25627
(There is no statute of limitations when a party seeks to set aside a judgment due to fraud upon the court.)

===============================================================

Results of Richard’s 60(b) motion for Relief

Richard Collette v. Susan R. Collette
Case file no.: 01-DR-10-0721
Heard by Jack A. Landis
ORDER TO DISMISS

This matter was heard on April 25, 2001 upon a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed on behalf of the Respondent, Susan R. Collette by her attorney, John Sinclaire, III.
Present at the hearing were the Petitioner, Richard S. Collette, his Paralegal, Lilly Smith and the Attorney for the Respondent, John Sinclaire, III. The Respondent, Susan R. Collette was not present.
After a review of all the pleadings and a brief submitted on behalf of the Petitioner ans [sic] after consideration of the argument made at the hearing, I find the crux of the allegations raised in the Complaint as follows:

1. A lack of jurisdiction of this court over the person of Mr. Collette,
2. An allegation of fraud supposedly perpetrated on the Petitioner and the Family Court in 1987,
3. The propriety of the execution of the settlement that was included in the original Order of Divorce, including the equitable division of property and child support, and
4. The possibility that the child for whom the support was paid is not the child of the Petitioner.

I further find that all of the issues raised are issues that could have been and should have been determined at the time of the final divorce hearing in 1987.

132. Landis had the evidence before him showing that officers of the court had defrauded Richard out of a hearing on the merits and he had been denied the opportunity to raise any issues at all.

From the Final Order of Divorce, issued by the Honorable B. J. Warshauer Case No. 87-DR-10-0294, Mr. Collette had the opportunity to appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court.

133. Landis had a duty to review the divorce decree and case file 87-DR-10-0294 as the frauds charged in those documents were the issue of this hearing.
134. Richard would have no grounds to appeal a Void order therefore Landis clearly knew the Appellate Court would not have had jurisdiction.
135. Landis had a duty and full authority to vacate any and all void orders.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=24882
McDavid v. McDavid. Sup. Ct. (1999) Op. No. 24882
As this matter had not been raised to or ruled on by the family court, it should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals.
Talley v. South Carolina Higher Educ. Tuition Grants Committee, 289 S.C. 483,
347 S.E.2d 99 (1986);
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http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLfiles/COA/3254.htm
Carolina First Corporation v. Whittle, App. Ct. (October 30, 2000) Op. No. 3254
Based on the above, it is clear that a ruling … was never issued. No such order is before us on appeal, and there is no issue for us to consider. SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 499, 392 S.E.2d 789, 793 (1990) (issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by the court below to be considered for appellate review).
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3167
Parker v. Shecut, App. Ct. (May 22, 2000) Op. No. 3167
It is axiomatic that an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court before the issue is preserved for appellate review. Medical Soc'y of South Carolina, 334 S.C. 270, 543 S.E.2d 352.
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/HTMLfiles/SC/25732.htm
State v. Dunbar, Sup. Ct. (2003) Op. No. 25732
In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge. Issues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. Humbert v. State, 345 S.C. 332, 548 S.E.2d 862 (2001).
An issue that was not preserved for review should not be addressed by the Court of Appeals, and the court’s opinion should be vacated to the extent it addressed an issue that was not preserved. Hendrix v. Eastern Distribution, Inc., 320 S.C. 218, 464 S.E.2d 112 (1995).
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http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLfiles/SC/25358.htm
Zabinski v. Bright Acres Associates, Sup. Ct. (2001) Op. No. 25358
… The merits … were never heard …. trial judge never ruled upon the allegations
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http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2007/2ndDistrict/January/2060401.pdf
In re MARRIAGE OF DAWN S. MARDJETKO, App. Ct. Ill. (2007) No. 2--06--0401
[W]hen the court entered … judgment it reserved fundamental issues, …, the judgment was not final. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal and so dismiss it.
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3792
Bateman v. Rouse, App. Ct. (2004) Op. No. 3792
On July 7, 1997, the family court declared the 1983 divorce decree void ab initio due to … misrepresentations and fraud upon the court in obtaining service by publication in his action for divorce.

He also had the right to file motions under Rules 59 and 60 of the South Carolina Rules of Practice. The time for appeal and the time for making those motions under the Rules have passed.

136. Landis had a duty to know and therefore did know that Richard had no right to file a motion under Rule 59, SCRCP, given the facts of this case.
137. Landis had a duty to know and therefore did know that no statute of limitations applied to Richard’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion alleging extrinsic fraud upon the court and that a 60(b) motion can be raised at any time.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=26188
BB&T v. Taylor, Sup. Ct. (2006) Op. No. 26188
Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP, provides: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [because] . . . the judgment is void.” A judgment is void if a court acts without personal jurisdiction. Thomas & Howard Co. v. T.W. Graham & Co., 318 S.C. 286, 291, 457 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1995).
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3351
Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., App. Ct. (2001); and
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25627
Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., Sup. Ct. (2003)
There is no statute of limitations when a party seeks to set aside a judgment due to fraud upon the court. Rule 60(b), SCRCP; see Hagy v. Pruitt, (March 20, 2000) supra (court has the inherent authority to set aside a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud in spite of any facially applicable statute of limitations). In order to secure equitable relief on the basis of fraud, the fraud must be extrinsic. Bryan v. Bryan, 220 S.C. 164, 66 S.E.2d 609 (1951) (extrinsic fraud is necessary in order to secure equitable relief vacating a prior judgment).
Extrinsic fraud is “fraud that induces a person not to present a case or deprives a person of the opportunity to be heard. Relief is granted for extrinsic fraud on the theory that because the fraud prevented a party from fully exhibiting and trying his case, there has never been a real contest before the court on the subject matter of the action.” Hilton Head Ctr. of South Carolina v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 294 S.C. 9, 11, 362 S.E.2d 176, 177 (1987).
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3648
Walsh v. Woods, App. Ct. (2003) Op. No. 3648
See Wilder Corp v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 77, 497 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1998) (noting that proper use of 59(e) motion is to preserve issues raised to but not ruled upon by the trial court); State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71, 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (excusing the failure to make a contemporaneous objection where the judge's comments are such that any objection would be futile); Jean Hoefer Toal et. al. Appellate Practice in South Carolina 65-68 (1999).
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=26193
Pye v. Fox, Sup. Ct. (2006) Op. No. 26193
Generally, an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court to be preserved. Elam v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Trans., 361 S.C. 9, 24, 602 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004) (noting a party must file a Rule 59(e) motion “when an issue or argument has been raised, but not ruled on, in order to preserve it for appellate review”). … “The purpose of Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend the judgment[,] is to request the trial judge to ‘reconsider matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.’” Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 172, 420 S.E.2d 834, 842 (1992) (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)).

The Complaint is in essence asking this Court for a readjudication of those issues; in effect, asking this Court to act as an appellate court and go behind Judge Warshauer’s final order issued in 1987. I cannot act in that capacity.

138. Landis submits a self-serving ‘escape clause’ for the court that is not in compliance with the facts and law in this case.
139. The family court never had jurisdiction in this case.
140. Shull who had the obligation to raise Susan’s pleadings to the court for a ruling instead falsely alleged a nonexistent agreement which Warshauer unlawfully signed.
141. The evidence before Landis plainly showed that there had never been any hearing on the merits and nothing had been established or adjudicated.
142. The court had been knowingly operating under a falsely alleged agreement in willful wanton violation of the law.
143. Richards’s 60(b)(4) motion was for Fraud Upon the Court and Landis had a duty and full authority to vacate all previous orders sua sponte and refer this case to General Sessions where it belonged.

http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/displayOpinionPF.cfm?caseNo=26186
Buckley v. Shealy, Sup. Ct. (2006) Op. No. 26186
In the present case, the parties did not enter an agreement on the record before the court. … See Ex Parte Dibble, 279 S.C 592, 595-96, 310 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ct. App. 1983) (stating the time honored equitable maxim that all courts have the inherent power to all things reasonable necessary to ensure that just results are reached to the fullest extent possible).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t20c007.htm
S.C. Code § 20-7-420 Jurisdiction of family court in domestic matters
(A) The family court has exclusive jurisdiction:
(25) To modify or vacate any order issued by the court.
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Sauner v. Public Service Authority, Sup. Ct. (2003), Op. No. 25648
Dinkins v. Robbins, 203 S.C 199, 26 S.E.2d 689 (1943). According to Dinkins, “the prior order of one Circuit Judge may not be modified by the subsequent order of another Circuit Judge, except in cases where the right to do so has been reserved to the succeeding Judge, when it is allowed by rule or statute, or when the subsequent order does not substantially affect the ruling or decision represented by the previous order.” 203 S.C. at 202, 26 S.E.2d at 690.
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25091
Hagy v. Pruitt, Sup. Ct. (March 20, 2000), Op. No. 25091
(… court has the inherent authority to set aside a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud in spite of any facially applicable statute of limitations).

This Court does have the capacity to review previous Orders pertaining to issues of custody, child support, visitation, and other issues relating to the welfare of the child, or alimony or spousal support, had it been ordered. In those cases, the Court’s right of review is limited to situations involving allegations of substantially changed circumstances.
I find that the Complaint in this case does not raise any allegations of substantially changed circumstances. The circumstances that have been alleged are circumstances that existed at the time this matter was decided in 1987. Accordingly, the allegations in the Complaint are not properly before me. There is no cause of action stated or predicated on any substantially changed circumstances.

144. Landis independently and improperly raises the issue of Change of Circumstances where the motion before him was clearly know by him to be 60(b).
145. Landis clearly saw that none of the issues he mentioned had ever been ‘decided’ by the court and all that existed was an alleged agreement that was in direct contravention of all established law.
146. Defrauding Richard out of a hearing on the merits and unlawfully imposing a fraudulent agreement was extrinsic fraud 60(b) which more than qualified as a substantial change of circumstances.
147. Someone in this court improperly changed the docket from the ‘Rule 60(b)’ motion that was actually filed to a hearing on ‘substantially changed circumstance’.
148. Lilly is informed and believes that Landis was the administrative judge during this period of time.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t20c007.htm
S.C. Code § 20-7-420 Jurisdiction of family court in domestic matters
(A) The family court has exclusive jurisdiction:
(25) To modify or vacate any order issued by the court.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sauner v. Public Service Authority, Sup. Ct. (2003), Op. No. 25648
Dinkins v. Robbins, 203 S.C 199, 26 S.E.2d 689 (1943). According to Dinkins, “the prior order of one Circuit Judge may not be modified by the subsequent order of another Circuit Judge, except in cases where the right to do so has been reserved to the succeeding Judge, when it is allowed by rule or statute, or when the subsequent order does not substantially affect the ruling or decision represented by the previous order.” 203 S.C. at 202, 26 S.E.2d at 690.
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/HTMLfiles/COA/2990.htm
Joiner v. Rivas, App. Ct. (1999) Op. No. 2990
The family court and this court on appeal have a duty to guard zealously the rights of parties under legal disability. See, e.g., Jean Hoefer Toal et al., Appellate Practice in South Carolina 69 (1999).

THEREFORE for the reasons hereinabove stated, for the fact that the issues raised in the Complaint are res judicata and for the fact that there has been no cause of action stated regarding substantially changed circumstances upon which this Court could review and modify the Order of Judge Warshauer,
IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed on behalf of the Respondent is granted.

149. This ruling from Landis is not in compliance with the facts and law in this case. See, abuse of discretion and error of law.
150. John Sinclaire, Esq. (Sinclaire) representing Susan actually had no case to present, relying on excuses without citations of law, however, it is recalled that he did mention the word Res judicata.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3282
Dept of Social Services v. Basnight, App. Ct.
Filed January 8, 2001
… Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, without fraud or collusion, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies. Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 51 S.E.2d 622 (1949). … In order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the following elements must be shown: (1) the identities of the parties are the same as the prior litigation; (2) the subject matter is the same as the prior litigation; and (3) there was a prior adjudication of the issue by a court of competent jurisdiction. Garris v. Governing Bd. of South Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 333 S.C. 432, 511 S.E.2d 48 (1998); Lowe v. Clayton, 264 S.C. 75, 212 S.E.2d 582 (1975); Wold v. Funderburg, 250 S.C. 205, 157 S.E.2d 180 (1967). Basnight has failed to establish the third element. A North Carolina court never issued a final order adjudicating the issues of paternity or the minor child's entitlement to support. Res judicata, therefore, does not apply to bar the subsequent suit on the merits. See Allen v. Southern Ry. Co., 218 S.C. 291, 62 S.E.2d 507 (1950) …; Gault v. Spoon, 168 S.C. 160, 167 S.E. 229 (1932) ... See also McEachern v. Black, 329 S.C. 642, 496 S.E.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1998) ... Accordingly, we affirm the family court's finding that the action was not barred by res judicata.
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http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&case=/data2/circs/7th/001429.html
United States v. County of Cook, 167 F.3d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing that the exception from res judicata for collateral attacks challenging jurisdiction is necessary "because otherwise a court that lacked jurisdiction could strong-arm a party to litigate the subject, decide in favor of its own power, and thus block any review of its adjudicatory competence.")
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3626
Nelson v. Coker, (2003)
Even when the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel have been met, they will not be rigidly or mechanically applied, and the application of the doctrines may be precluded where unfairness or injustice results, or public policy requires it. Id.; Carrigg v. Cannon, 347 S.C. 75, 552 S.E.2d 767 (Ct. App. 2001). … We recognize that there have been instances when collateral estoppel or res judicata have not been invoked for countervailing public policy concerns. See, Johns, 309 S.C. at 203, 420 S.E.2d at 859 (refusing to apply a consent order entered by the family court finding husband and wife married at common law because giving the order collateral estoppel effect would violate the State’s policy finding bigamous marriages void as mandated by statute). However, in these cases, collateral estoppel was in conflict with existing public policy concerns.
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http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25793
Raby Construction v. Orr, Sup. Ct. (2004) Op. No. 25793
fn. [3] citing, Johnson v. Johnson, 310 S.C. 44, 425 S.E.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1992). Respondent argues that because Orr has not appealed this finding, it is the law of the case. We disagree. … Furthermore, we note the Johnson court ultimately granted relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) …

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition [sic] may not raise the allegations contained in his Complaint in the hearing of Respondent’s Rule To Show Cause motion scheduled to be heard on May 16, 2001.

151. The last sentence of Landis speaks for itself, abuse of discretion, to say the least.

http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=26193
Pye v. Fox, Sup. Ct. (2006) Op. No. 26193
The elements of a civil conspiracy in South Carolina are (1) the combination of two or more people, (2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, (3) which causes special damages. “[I]n order to establish a conspiracy, evidence, direct or circumstantial, must be produced from which a party may reasonably infer the joint assent of the minds of two or more parties to the prosecution of the unlawful enterprise.”
This Court has observed: Conspiracy may be inferred from the very nature of the acts done, the relationship of the parties, the interests of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances. Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 358 S.E.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1987). “Civil conspiracy is an act which is by its very nature covert and clandestine and usually not susceptible of proof by direct evidence. . . .” Id. at 601, 358 S.E.2d at 153. An action for civil conspiracy is an action at law; the trial judge’s findings will be upheld on appeal unless they are without evidentiary support. Gynecology Clinic v. Cloer, 334 S.C. 555, 514 S.E.2d 592 (1999). Peoples Federal, 358 S.C. at 470, 596 S.E.2d at 57.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of May, 2001.
_________________________________
THE HONORABLE JACK A. LANDIS
Judge of the Family Court
Ninth Judicial Circuit
Charleston, South Carolina.

ATTEST: A TRUE COPY
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG (SEAL)
CLERK, FAMILY COURT
By Hazel S. Smalls
DEPUTY CLERK

===============================================================

152. Lilly alleges and believes the May 11, 2001 improper order of Landis to dismiss Richard’s complaint serves as evidence of an on-going pattern of public corruption and fraud by officers of the court.
153. The scheduled May 16, 2001 RTSC was continued until June 13, 2001 and then heard by Landis.
154. Richard had previously warned the SSA (Charleston, S.C.) in December 2000 and January 2001 that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion was being brought in part to address Susan’s fraudulent and untried allegations of paternity.
155. In reckless wanton disregard of Richard’s warning and the proofs of paternity required of all persons of similar circumstances, the SSA (Florida) recklessly / negligently allowed Susan to fraudulently place her illegitimate child on auxiliary benefits under Richard’s award of SSD in April of 2001 or earlier.

http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.17/handbook-1710.html
1710. Does a court decree of paternity prove a child is yours?
A court decree finding that you are the child's mother or father must:
A. Identify you and the child;
B. Include a specific finding that you are the child's biological parent; and
C. Must have been issued before your death and be certified by the proper official.
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http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.17/handbook-1711.html
1711. Does a court order for support prove a child is yours?
A court order for support must:
A. Identify the child:
B. Direct you to contribute to the child's support;
C. Either name you as the child's parent or have been issued under a child support statute; and
D. Have been issued before your death.
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http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.04/handbook-0411.html
411. What is the definition of "child" for Social Security purposes?
The term "child" includes the insured worker's:
A. Natural (e.g., biological) legitimate child, or any other child who would have the right under applicable State law to inherit intestate personal property from the insured worker as his or her child;
B. Natural child, provided the insured worker:
1. Has acknowledged in writing that the child is his or her son or daughter;
2. Has been decreed by a court to be the parent of the child;
3. Has been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the child because the child is his or her son or daughter; or Has been shown to be the child's father or mother by other reasonable evidence. The worker must have lived with the child
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http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/oasi/09/SSR89-09-oasi-09.html
Luke for Luke v. Bowen, 868 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1989)
"[T]he status of child [under the state statute] is primarily based on a biological relationship which requires that the individual acknowledging the child have had the capacity or opportunity to father the child." Citing, McMillian by McMillian v. Heckler, 759 F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir. 1985) [I]t is clear that Congress intended that a claimant invoking either of the alternative means of establishing entitlement provided by § 416(h)(3)(C) should be put to proving as one ultimate fact that the insured was his natural parent. * * * [P]arentage of the insured is an ultimate fact to be proven under either subparagraph (C)(i) or (C)(ii).

156. Lilly has a full transcript of the June 13, 2001 RTSC heard by Landis.
157. Sinclaire’s statements on the transcript and his bill for attorney’s fees show he had full knowledge of this case and was therefore without excuse for proceeding in this action.
158. Susan and Sinclaire falsely alleged numerous willful failures of Richard to comply with the past orders of the court in full knowledge that all of those orders were Void ab initio.
159. Susan and Sinclaire were knowingly engaging in multiple felonies such as perjury, subornation of perjury, barratry, extortion, abuse, exploitation, stalking and harassing Richard through the courts in full knowledge that he was now proven to be fully disabled by the SSA.

http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t43c035.htm
S.C. Code § 43-35-10 Definitions
… (3) "Exploitation" means: … (b) an improper, unlawful, or unauthorized use of the funds, assets, property … of a vulnerable adult by a person for the profit or advantage of that person or another person; (11) "Vulnerable adult" means a person who has a physical or mental condition which substantially impairs … This includes a person who is impaired in the ability to adequately provide for the person's own care or protection because of the infirmities of aging including, but not limited to, organic brain damage, advanced age, and physical, mental, or emotional dysfunction.
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http://www.scstatehouse.net/code/t16c003.htm
S.C. Code § 16-3-1050 … perpetrating or … exploitation of a vulnerable adult; penalties
… (D) A person who knowingly and wilfully exploits a vulnerable adult is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and may be required by the court to make restitution. …

160. Susan testified that “she had placed her child on auxiliary benefits under the SSD award granted to Richard and the monthly amount would be five hundred seventy four ($574.00) dollars per month”. (June 13, 2001 transcript page 19, line 23.)
161. SSA records confirm that Susan was receiving Five hundred seventy five ($575.00) dollars per month and that the first three checks totaling One thousand seven hundred twenty five ($1,725.00) dollars had been received by June 3, 2001 -- ten days before this fraudulent RTSC.
162. Landis who had previously given the impression in his order from the May 11, 2001 hearing that paternity had been inexplicably established by Susan’s years of success in her fraud now on June 13, 2001 does not grant Richard credit for those auxiliary benefits paid for that same child through Richard’s SSD award.
163. If Landis had any supportable belief in Richard’s paternity, he was obligated by law to grant Richard credit for the auxiliary benefits.
164. Landis improperly objected to Lilly’s presentation of supporting case law.
165. The cases of Justice v. Scruggs, 332 SE 2d 106-SC: Court of Appeals 1985; Perteet v. Sumner, 246 Ga. 182, 269 S.E.2d 453 (1980) (citing Horton v. Horton, 219 Ga. 177, 132 S.E.2d 200 (1963)); Lovett v. Lovett, 311 S.C. 279, 428 S.E.2d 874 (1993) where placed on the bench in front of Landis disregarding his objection.

http://www.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art200011.html
… [T]he overwhelming majority of states that have considered the question of how a court should consider a child's receipt of Social Security dependency benefits in the determination of an individual's child support obligations have allowed the child support obligor a dollar-for-dollar credit against the amount of Social Security benefits received by the child. … Perteet v. Sumner, 246 Ga. 182, 269 S.E.2d 453 (1980) (citing Horton v. Horton, 219 Ga. 177, 132 S.E.2d 200 (1963)) ; Lovett v. Lovett, 311 S.C. 279, 428 S.E.2d 874 (1993); … [A] payor spouse is entitled to a credit for Social Security disability benefits received by that spouse's children, because the benefits represent a substitute for the payor's income. …

166. Lilly had made every effort, albeit futile, to get the court to vacate the previous unlawful orders.
167. If the court persisted in their unlawful stand, then Richard would have to be granted credit for the auxiliary benefits that Susan was fraudulently receiving for her illegitimate child.
168. Richard would otherwise be forced to face dire financial penalties and future jailing on bogus charges of failure to provide child support.
169. Landis ignoring all law and equity illegally ordered Richard to provide Susan an additional three hundred fifty ($350.00) dollars per month out of his SSD income which was to be paid through the court with the court’s processing fees added on (See, extortion, racketeering, abuse and exploitation of a disabled person, et cetera.).
170. The Three hundred fifty ($350.00) dollars per month is broken down into the following:
a. Two hundred ($200.00) dollars per month in fraudulent child support criminally extorted on top of the Five hundred seventy five ($575.00) dollars per month that Susan was already fraudulently receiving under Richard’s SSD auxiliary benefits.
b. Fifty ($50.00) dollars per month in fraudulent and nonexistent arrearages.
c. Three thousand two hundred seventy seven and 34/100 ($3,277.34) dollars to be paid at a rate of One hundred ($100.00) dollars per month to purge a fraudulent contempt imposed by Landis for failure to provide the 1987 policy of insurance ordered by Warshauer -- which Patterson had ordered Susan to provide through her employment in 1989.
171. The dollar amount of $3,277.34 was unilaterally determined by Susan and based on ten years of back medical bills which Susan had never presented for reimbursement until now -- on Sinclaire’s improper advice.
172. Landis ruled that Susan could not receive reimbursement for medical bills she had failed to present.
173. Landis then “readjudicated / modified” the 1989 order of Patterson by fraudulently finding Richard in contempt for Susan’s failure to provide the policy of insurance as ordered.
174. Those medical bills contain evidence of Susan defrauding her own child out of medical coverage until May 5, 1995 -- after the court had extorted funds out of Richard for Susan to provide a policy of insurance through her employment.
175. Landis increased Susan’s monthly take in her fraudulent enterprise to nine hundred twenty five ($925.00) dollars per month -- and never required the same substantial change of circumstances be filed by Susan that he had previously improperly required of Richard.
176. Richard was disabled and would not be eligible for Medicare until 2003 and he was to be left with only Eight hundred ($800.00) dollars per month to meet his medical and living expenses.
177. Susan did not stop there. Susan had Richard illegally arrested and jailed on false charges of failure to provide child support while she continued to fraudulently receive monthly auxiliary benefits for the support of her illegitimate child under Richard’s SSD award.
178. Richard was subjected to two illegal garnishments in this case.
179. The case file record plainly shows the court knowingly engaging in creative subtractions to fraudulently create arrearages.
180. The language used in the orders of garnishment prepared by Sinclaire plainly show knowingly fraudulent arguments to support the illegal garnishment.
181. Richard was finally left with Four hundred four ($404.00) dollars per month to meet his medical and living expenses.
182. Susan walked away with a total of One thousand three hundred thirty seven ($1,337.00) dollars per month through her court supported efforts in Social Security fraud all on a falsely alleged divorce agreement which never existed in fact or law.
183. Sinclaire was granted Two thousand ($2,000.00) dollars in attorney fees which was included in the illegal garnishment of Richard’s SSD income.

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13755310345668865705&q=Francis+P.+Segars-Andrews&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
SEGARS-ANDREWS v. JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION COMMISSION, SC: Supreme Court 2010
While the complaint of Petitioner raises substantial and concerning judicial independence issues, it is our firm judgment that the law provides her no relief.
COMPLAINT DISMISSED.
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Segars-Andrews criminally punished Richard Collette for seeking relief by jailing him and stealing his SSDI.

184. Sinclaire acknowledged his full review of the case record and his awareness of the 1987 order of Warshauer and the 1989 order of Patterson in the June 13, 2001 transcript and on his bill for atty. fees. Sinclaire had a duty to know and therefore did know that there was no lawful order of child support in existence.
185. Sinclaire had a duty to know and therefore did know that his representation of Susan solely relied on perjury, subornation of perjury, abuse of process and malicious prosecution, et cetera.
186. Sinclaire had seventeen (17) years experience in criminal law as a deputy solicitor and therein had absolute knowledge that all of his arguments in this case made him a party before and after the fact in Susan’s Social Security fraud.
187. The court signed an order ending child support on October 7, 2004. However, the illegal garnishment continued well beyond that date and the court continued to illegally collect their handling fees.
188. Susan’s case throughout its entire history has rested exclusively on false allegations and conclusory arguments without ever presenting any evidence, corroborating testimony or citations of supporting law.
189. While Susan has been allowed to willfully wantonly stalk, malign and slander Richard throughout this case to cloak and cloud her illegal acts, she admitted on the record that she had no personal knowledge concerning Richard (since the separation of 1986) -- it was all “hearsay” (June 13, 2001 transcript page 23, lines 17-20).
190. Susan refused to disclose the identity of her gossip conduit to Lilly for cross-examination.
191. Richard’s personal history is exemplary and far above that of Susan Lee Rice and other defendants in this case.

http://archives.postandcourier.com/archive/arch95/1295/arc1216118567.shtml
Two judge candidates screened
Published on 12/16/95
BY JOHN HEILPRIN
The Post and Courier
COLUMBIA - Two of four candidates for a Family Court judgeship in the Lowcountry - O. Grady Query and Jack A. Landis - appeared Friday before a legislative panel screening candidates. … The panel held a brief closed-door session, as it has with several of the candidates, to discuss an undisclosed matter with Landis.

Landis had disclosed four (4) tax liens totaling over Twenty seven ($27,000.00) thousand dollars which should have prevented him from being appointed to the bench. There is a public interest in knowing what was not disclosed.

192. If trial by hearsay is to be the standard in this case then Lilly is prepared to disclose information acquired through her investigation and she will name her contacts for follow-up by a qualified criminal investigator.

S.C. Code § 16-1-60. Violent crimes defined.
For purposes of definition under South Carolina law, a violent crime includes the offenses of: … drug trafficking as defined in Section 44-53-370(e) or trafficking cocaine base as defined in Section 44-53-375(C); manufacturing or trafficking methamphetamine as defined in Section 44-53-375; … accessory before the fact to commit any of the above offenses (Section 16-1-40); attempt to commit any of the above offenses (Section 16-1-80)…
Only those offenses specifically enumerated in this section are considered violent offenses.

193. The issues in this case are criminal and warrant full involvement in pursuit of criminal investigation, indictment and prosecution.
194. The record of this case stands in evidence that each and every licensed attorney appearing for Richard failed to provide competent representation and engaged in collusion and conspiracy to varying degree in these frauds.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/
Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 1480 (June 7, 2007)
Read the opinions (majority) (concurrence) (dissent)

JOHNSON v. JOHNSON, Mich. App. (2007) Op. No. 261919
O’Connell, J. (concurring).
I concur with the majority opinion. I write separately to emphasize the restrictions that our Legislature has placed on judges to protect litigants from confusion and protect the court system from abuse. To ignore the mandatory nature of the statute leaves plaintiff, and those like him, with a remediless error … Rather than encourage confusion, sloppiness, and abuse, we must enforce the statute as written and place plaintiff in the position he would have been in if the error had not occurred: before a trial court, prepared to adjudicate his legal rights. Our court rules reiterate these principles. In this case, it was manifest injustice for the court to default plaintiff for his failure to follow the statutorily defective and otherwise infirm order, but the trial court did not consider any other sanction on the record. Gawlik v Rengachary, 270 Mich App 1, 9; 714 NW2d 386 (2006). /s/ Peter D. O’Connell

195. Susan has been aided and abetted by officers of the court in her felonious acts and the slandering, stalking and harassing of Richard through the court for years causing immeasurable emotional pain, suffering and fear.
196. Richard has suffered a number of false arrests, false imprisonments, the loss of property and financial resources therein depriving him of his dignity and the right to provide for his psychiatric, medical and dental care causing him immense physical and emotional pain and suffering.
197. Richard has suffered damages to his credit history in direct consequence of the long term fraud and extortion in this case.
198. Lilly has been unlawfully deprived of the full financial support of her husband Richard from April 5, 1999 forward by the frauds in this case.
199. Lilly has suffered immeasurable emotional pain, suffering and physical stress in witnessing the crimes against her husband Richard including false arrest and imprisonment.
200. Richard is clearly entitled to full restitution of property and funds he has lost through these frauds with the appropriate legal rate of interest.
201. Richard is entitled to appropriate correction of damages to his credit history caused through these frauds.
202. Richard is entitled to expungement of all records of arrest and confinement caused through these frauds.
203. Richard is entitled to correction of the birth certificate fraudulently procured for the illegitimate child of Susan.
204. The record of this case stands in evidence that Richard is not culpable in the injuries suffered through failure to exercise due diligence.
205. Richard did attempt to protect his rights.
206. Lilly attempted to protect Richard’s rights and therein her own.
207. Richard and Lilly were both severely financially penalized and punished for their efforts.
208. Susan Lee Rice alias Susan R. Collette (SS # 249-23-3809) was known to reside at 640 Birgham Place, Lake Mary, Florida 32746, telephone number (407) 321-4855. Susan is now believed to be residing at 2030 Schoharie Court, Orlando, Florida 32817-4822, telephone numbers (407) 658-2635 or (407) 658-6334 with one Rupert Laurence Ali Meghnot purported to be her husband.
209. John Doe Rice alias Richard Prentiss Collette (SS # 251-75-6980) is alleged and believed to be in residence with Susan.

http://149.101.1.32/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5206.pdf
Social Security Fraud
November 2004
Volume 52, Number 6
… Additionally, OCCIG operates an attorney-on-call program. Individuals from other agencies or organizations may call or e-mail the duty attorney to obtain guidance, assistance, and other information within SSA/OIG's purview. The attorney-on-call frequently assists Assistant United States Attorneys with matters involving fraud, waste, or abuse pertaining to SSA and its programs. This assistance includes, but is not limited to, the development of language necessary for the prosecution of violations of Title 42 of the United States Code, the development of cases involving identity theft or Social Security number misuse under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028 and 1029, and research into issues particular to SSA fraud. The OCCIG attorney-on-call may be reached by calling (410) 965-6211, Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. EST.
For more information on SSA/OIG, please visit the website at http://www.ssa.gov/oig/index.htm.
Prosecuting Title II Cases: Protecting the Social Security Trust Funds from Fraud
John K. Webb
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Central District of California
IV. Statutory authority
The felony fraud provisions of the Title II programs are found in 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(1)-(8) of the Act. Most fraud involving the Title II benefits programs is the result of deliberate deception, and arises when an applicant falsifies a document or record offered as proof of disability, or misrepresents material facts, such as paternity, on an application for benefits.

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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12371046240155192268&q=sham+issue+of+material+fact&hl=en&as_sdt=2000000000004
Brandt v. Gooding, 630 SE 2d 259 - SC: Supreme Court 2006
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint as a sanction for civil contempt. Dismissal of the complaint is a proper sanction against a complainant who submits fraudulent documents to the court. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision.

In the case of fraud and public corruption

Friday, August 6, 2010

Bar notes substance abuse in profession

Saturday, July 31, 2010